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ABSTRACT
EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
WITHIN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
Aaron B. Lang
Old Dominion University, May 2012
Director: John M. Ritz

The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective
employment of command and control (C2) systems to enhance warfighter readiness. Five
research hypotheses guided this study, which addressed the perception of the effective
employment of Marine Corps C2 systems based on demographic characteristics, which
included: organization, occupational field, experience, rank, and recent deployment
experience.
The population of the study included Active and Reserve Staff Noncommissioned Officers (SNCOs) and Officers that now serve, or have recently served in
an infantry unit within the Operating Forces, and the Marines and civilian employees
involved in the capability development, acquisition, and training of C2 systems from
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. Data was collected from
this population using a web-based survey conducted during the months of December
2011 and January 2012. The total response rate for this study was approximately 11%,
which consisted of 551 participants.
The /-test was used to address Hypothesisoi and Hypothesisos, while one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to address Hypothesiso2, Hypothesises, and
Hypothesisoi The results identified statistically significant findings in each of the five
research hypotheses across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership

and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. Recommendations for
improvement are provided to address each of the significant findings, which is followed
by recommendations for further research as a result of this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introducing new information technology (IT) within an organization requires a
detailed strategy to ensure the new technology helps the organization, rather than hinders
it. This becomes increasingly complex for large organizations operating in a global
economy. In these situations, Shore (2006) suggests that budgets are often
underestimated, technical challenges frequently arise, and resistance to change by
employees can all have an adverse impact on successful implementation of new IT. To
overcome these challenges, the organization must make critical decisions to ensure
success. These decisions must be based on forecasted requirements that are often difficult
to predict. Why change something if the old system works? Hill and Friday-Stroud
(2009) claim that an organization's reaction to the latest and greatest technology is what
often drives decision-making. This desire for a competitive edge is what organizations
are seeking. As technology continues to evolve, keeping pace with the latest trends can be
costly to develop, implement, train, and evaluate. This study will introduce Marine Corps
training concepts, review the fundamentals of training program evaluation, provide an
understanding of the acquisition challenges unique to the Marine Corps when purchasing
IT, and managing associated organizational change.
Within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), implementing new IT can present
even greater challenges because operating areas change as conflicts occur in different
locations around the world. When the decision is made to send U.S. troops into harm's
way, missions vary, which influence different strategic objectives, depending on where
the troops will be located. Conflict rarely provides a static environment, which requires
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smart decision-making regarding what the forces will need in relation to IT. What may
have served as the right IT solutions in a previous engagement may not provide the
desired results in future conflicts. Additionally, the American people demand that the
U.S. Armed Forces are best equipped with the latest technologies to provide a decisive
advantage over the adversary.
To overcome some of these challenges, a detailed and elaborate enterprise IT
strategy must be developed. As IT strategies are developed, organizations must evaluate
how they will respond to the current needs of the users. Clegg (1988) found that
decisions are often made without considering how these changes will affect routine
business processes. Clegg further states that "there is a lack of strategic thinking about
IT" (p. 134). Many parameters must be evaluated to ensure decisions are made smartly
based on several constraints. In addition to implementing a new software solution,
decision-makers must assess a training plan. Although the next best thing may be the
latest technological solution, it may be overly complicated, creating a significant training
requirement. An assessment of utility must be conducted to determine other effects of
fielding an IT solution. Strassman (2003) suggests that while it may appear to promise
great results, the cost of implementation may outweigh the current method of doing
business.
Developing an enterprise IT strategy forces leadership, decision-makers, and IT
managers to think through the lasting impacts of implementing new IT within an
organization. Most importantly, an IT strategy evaluates life-cycle costs, which far
surpass the initial purchase price of the technology. With any change affecting routine
business processes, new IT can have a significant impact on how employees perform
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their daily functions. Management must effectively communicate the change in advance,
inform the users regarding the benefits or the new application, and ensure that they are
aware that training and support will be provided to ease the transition. With any
organizational change regarding IT, training design, development, and delivery must be
addressed and exercised to assure training objectives are achieved. To determine the
effectiveness of the associated training, organizations must implement training program
evaluation to ensure these objectives are being met and, ultimately, determine the
effectiveness of the new IT application (Chiara & Vincenzo, 2008). If any of these
procedures are overlooked or marginalized, the organization is not truly thinking through
the requirements of making a change to the legacy IT systems architecture, which may
actually reflect a negative return on investment.
Exercising command and control (C2) in a complex and dynamic combat
environment provides a significant challenge to top commanders of the U.S. armed
forces. The advent of new IT solutions, and, as a result, new C2 systems in recent years
has made an attempt to simplify the flow of information, aiming to increase shared
situational awareness down to the lowest level. Because many of these technologies have
been developed within a specific warfighting function, this has resulted in a disparate
array of multiple, independent software applications creating significant training and
implementation challenges for the warfighter.
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective
employment of command and control (C2) systems to enhance warfighter readiness.
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Hypotheses
To guide this study, the following hypotheses were established:
Hoi: There is no difference in the perception of the effective employment of
Marine Corps C2 systems between the Operating Forces and Headquarters,
Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment across the Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF)
construct.
H02: There is no relationship between occupational field and the perception of the
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF
construct.
H03: There is no relationship between experience and the perception of the
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF
construct.
H04: There is no relationship between rank and the perception of the effective
employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct.
H05: There is no relationship between recent deployment experience and the
perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the
DOTMLPF construct.
Background and Significance
The implementation of a new IT solution can be very costly in ways other than
merely dollars and cents. Not only must an organization consider the purchase price, but
they must also consider the total life-cycle costs associated with implementing, training,
sustaining, and servicing the product. This is not only a monetary consideration, but a
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time consideration, as well. The amount of time needed to train users on the new tool
must be addressed prior to making a funding decision. Support services typically add to
the total cost, but if they are not considered and the organization runs into problems it
may impact operations. For these reasons, an organization must conduct a thorough
analysis before making a purchase decision. Regarding the cost of IT, Benamati and
Lederer (2005) suggested that implementing new IT:
Can produce the need for new skills and thus unforeseen training demands. It can
also increase staffing requirements, cause the unanticipated need to integrate old
and new IT, and create dilemmas about which particular IT to acquire and when
to acquire it. (p. 83)
Acquiring new IT based on the latest technological solution being available does
not mean that an organization should quickly implement it. Beyond the capability of the
tool, one must consider the effects that are introduced into organizational processes when
purchase decisions are made. Hill and Friday-Stroud (2009) claim that "many
organizations are implementing leading technologies and creating an abundance of
information without considering the attributes of the information (e.g., its complexity,
level of aggregation, reliability, ambiguity, timeliness) and obstacles that may impede
effective use of the information" (p. 2).
Within the U.S. Marine Corps, integrating old and new systems and tools can be
problematic. Perhaps a software engineer understands these issues, but how is that
translated to the user? This presents significant challenges that must be addressed. After a
decision has been made to acquire a new IT solution, the organization must develop a
plan to implement the tool among the users.
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Furthermore, decision-makers must evaluate utility versus the capacity of
information that is helpful to the user. Hill and Friday-Stroud (2009) further suggested
that "system designers and trainers should continuously be aware of the differences that
exist in users' task constraints, information processing needs and capabilities when
designing technological systems and user-friendly interfaces, selecting output formats,
and designing training programs" (p. 8). It is not always the best decision to evaluate a
new IT solution in isolation. What currently exists, and how does the proposed IT
solution fit into the systems architecture? This kind of detailed analysis is often beyond
the scope and capability of the individual making the purchase decision. During the
assessment stage of determining IT requirements, an organization could gain by
incorporating these guidelines. To truly understand the costs associated with
implementing the appropriate training plan, a training expert must be included in the
decision-making process. If this is overlooked, a major adjustment to the budget should
be anticipated to correct training shortfalls. If not, an organization should expect limited
utility from the IT solution.
Because the complexity of IT solutions continues to increase (Shore, 2006),
organizations have been outsourcing their IT support functions. This typically comes with
a significant cost for services. The U.S. Armed Forces are doing this as well. Often, the
U.S. military does not have the benefit of time to train when implementing new
technologies. As a result, they would rather pay someone else to ensure the capability is
available, even if uniformed personnel are not the ones providing system administration
on the tools (Edwards, 2011). While this may be the best strategy in the short term, the
only way to overcome this requirement in future conflicts is to train the force to operate
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its own equipment. This is significant because contracted and/or civilian personnel will
not always be able to accompany uniformed service members when entering a hostile
territory. Again, training is an investment of both time and money. Commanders must
evaluate what the training is worth to be best prepared for crisis response.
Adopting new policy regarding IT decisions is often difficult for organizations to
manage. Like most organizations, change to current processes usually face challenges
until it becomes common practice. Langer (2005) found that implementing new IT often
creates a dynamic of organizational change. The implementation of new IT not only
requires a change in business practices, but often requires a change in implementation
policy, as well. To best overcome these issues, organizations must become educated on
the effects of organizational change and incorporate an organizational change
management strategy. Following an understanding of the potential effects of
implementing new IT, leadership can begin shaping the training required to truly benefit
from its use.
Limitations
The findings of this research were limited by the following parameters:
1. This study focused specifically on C2 systems, which is one of many forms of IT
used within the Armed Forces consisting of both hardware and software.
2. Research was conducted focusing only on C2 system users and those that
develop, train, and equip the Operating Forces within the U.S. Marine Corps.
3. This study was focused on the effective employment of C2 systems used within
the Combat Operations Center (COC) by the infantry community.

8
Assumptions
Assumptions of this study were:
1. IT procurement policy would continue to evolve during the course of this study;
2. Training requirements will continue to increase with the fielding of new IT;
3. Marine Corps business processes can be informed through this study;
4. Time required to train will continue to impact operational readiness, and;
5. The population selected for this study adequately represents the views of their
peers in the U.S. Marine Corps.
Procedures
To address this problem, the researcher reviewed relevant Marine Corps
documentation pertaining to the capabilities development, acquisition, and
implementation of new IT applications to develop a thorough understanding of the
environment. Existing data from U.S. Marine Corps sources and published articles from
private industry were used to assess the challenges of implementing new technologies.
Following an initial study of documentation within the Marine Corps, research was
conducted to find out what has been done in recent history within private industry to
identify strategies to overcome organizational change associated with the implementation
of new IT.
Following an initial review of existing data, the researcher developed a survey to
address the stated research questions. The survey incorporated closed-ended questions
with a five-point Likert-scale. The survey was provided via a web link that was
distributed to the sample.
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Following data collection, statistical analysis was conducted to compare sample
means of group responses to identify trends and patterns. Sample groups were created
based on the respondent's organization (Headquarters, Marine Corps and Supporting
Establishment as one group, and Marines from the Operating Forces as the other group).
Beyond the two primary groups, demographic information was collected to determine if
there were statistically significant differences in responses based on occupational field,
rank, experience, and recent deployment experience (within the past three years).
Definition of Terms
To ensure the reader understands the study, in context, basic definitions have been
provided that are somewhat unique to the Marine Corps and DoD culture. These terms
are used several times throughout the study.
After-Action Reports (AAR) can be defined as a report written and published by an
operational unit that has recently returned from a deployment in support of an operation.
Within the AAR, units address their challenges, recommendations for improvement, as
well as what tactics, techniques, and procedures were used to overcome some of the
challenges that were encountered during deployment.
Command and Control (C2) is defined by the Department of Defense (DoD) as the
following: the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and
control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of
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the mission (Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
2010).
Combat Operations Center (COC) is the facility from which unit leadership conducts
command and control in support of their unit and commander.
Command and Control Systems can be defined as a form of information technology or
information system, consisting of hardware and software, that enables the act of C2.
Doctrine can be defined as guiding principles employed by military forces to achieve
stated objectives. It is a guide, but is not an absolute way of conducting each operation.
Effective Employment of C2 Systems can be defined as the ability of an individual or a
unit to utilize C2 systems to perform their intended functions in an operational setting as
a result of training.
Fielding can be defined as the implementation of a new technology to the user-level.
Information Technology can be defined as any software or hardware that enables the
exchange of information.
Information Systems can be defined as any software application that enables the
exchange of information. IT and IS are used interchangeably throughout this study.
IT Solutions can be defined as IT tools that meet the needs of the organization.
Operating Forces can be defined as operational units of the Marine Corps.
Headquarters, Marine Corps can be defined as the leadership entities that are
responsible for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) within the
Marine Corps.
Supporting Establishment can be defined as the component of the Marine Corps that
supports warfighter requirements in peacetime and during the time of war.
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Users can be defined as anyone that uses an IT/IS application or C2 system.
Warfighter can be defined as a service member operating in support of a military
operation.
Warfighter Readiness can be defined as the individual Marine's ability to perform
his/her assigned duties as a result of training and preparation.
Summary and Overview
Deep-rooted in the doctrine of the Marine Corps, there is a statement that was
written into a doctrinal publication regarding the adoption of technological capabilities.
MCDP-1, Warfighting (1996) states the following:
There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology
and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities. Technology can
enhance the ways and means of war by improving humanity's ability to wage it,
but technology cannot and should not attempt to eliminate humanity from the
process of waging war. (p. 67)
This states the root of the problem of this study. Technology should help to perform a
function more effectively, increase a shared understanding, or simplify a process. If an
organization is over-reliant on technology, they will likely be ineffective if the
technology fails. To overcome this problem, organizations such as the Marine Corps must
plan to learn and use technology, but consider how this technology helps or prohibits
operational success.
The challenges of implementing IT within an organization must be carefully
considered to ensure the return on investment (ROI) is maximized. If the users are not
properly trained on an IT solution's capabilities, and how it fits in with existing IT, the
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ROI is likely to be low. There are several components that must be considered when
making an IT procurement decision. The purpose of this study was to identify potential
barriers to the effective employment of C2 systems. Through this study, the researcher
was able to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of C2 systems as
perceived by Marine Corps leaders and warfighters in the Operating Forces.
Chapter I identified hypotheses and limitations to establish the scope of this study.
Chapter II provides a comprehensive literature review to introduce Marine Corps training
concepts, review the fundamentals of training program evaluation, provide an
understanding of the acquisition challenges unique to the Marine Corps when purchasing
IT, and managing associated organizational change. Chapter III details the procedures
and methods used to address the stated hypotheses. The research variables are explained,
and validity and reliability of the survey that was implemented in this study are
addressed. Chapter IV explains the results and findings, and, lastly, Chapter V addresses
the summary, conclusions, and recommendations.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This review of literature begins with an overview of U.S. Marine Corps
organizational structure. Following this introduction, current acquisition policy and
practices are explained to provide the reader with an understanding of the unique
requirements of the U.S. Armed Forces when developing and purchasing new
capabilities. Challenges to current policy are also addressed. The next part of the chapter
focuses on training within the Marine Corps following the purchase of a new capability.
The subject of training program evaluation is introduced to explain how effectiveness can
be determined. Following these topics, the subject of an information system strategy is
introduced, which takes the reader closer to the problem within this study. Lastly, as a
result of introducing an information system strategy, organizational change management
is addressed to highlight how the implementation of new systems can have a better
chance of success.
U.S. Marine Corps Organizational Structure
Operating as part of the U.S. Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps is
relatively small when compared to the other armed forces of the United States. "Since
1775, the Marine Corps has served as an expeditionary force organized and trained to act
in the national security interest and carry out the national military strategy" (MCDP 1 -0,
1998, p. 1-4). Currently, the Active Component of the Marine Corps consists of just over
202,000 Marines, and due to anticipated budget cuts looming ahead, this number will
likely fall to a number closer to 180,000 (SeaPower, 2011). The Marine Corps Reserve
consists of approximately 40,000 Marines. This number will likely remain the same
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following a sharp decrease in overall personnel. The Marine Corps' organization consists
of four major components, which include Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the operating
forces, the supporting establishment, and Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)
(MCDP 1-0, 1998). Due to current operations, there seems to be more of a blend of active
and Reserve Marines in the operating forces. Many Reserve Marines have mobilized as
an individual augment to the active forces, while there is a routine cycle of reserve units
deploying in support of real-world operations along with active duty units.
Warfighting Functions
The Marine Corps is organized around six warfighting functions. These include
Command and Control (C2), maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, and force protection
(MCRP 5-12D, 1998). Although these are all independent of one another, no function
successfully operates without C2. "C2 is the overarching warfighting function that
enables all other warfighting functions" (MCDP 1-0,1998, p. A-l). Despite its critical
importance, there is no primary military occupational specialty (MOS) centered on
exercising C2 within the Ground Combat Element (GCE). The communications
occupational field (OCCFLD) provides the infrastructure to enable C2, but it does not
have the primary mission of exercising C2. This responsibility lies with the users of the
technology. For example, an infantry battalion uses the C2 systems during operations,
while the communicators assigned to that unit build the network architecture, load
required software, and provide telephone and radio systems.
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Organization and Structure
During times of crisis, the Marine Corps responds to requests for forces by
deploying a task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF
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spans the warfighting functions to provide an expeditionary warfighting capability
consisting of four components: a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element
(GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). By
organizing the MAGTF this way, the Marine Corps deploys with organic assets and
supplies to sustain itself for a period of time until resupply, which is determined by the
size of the MAGTF. The USMC prides itself on its combined arms capabilities. In the
Marine Corps, everyone supports the infantry. No single entity or warfighting function
operates independently. Rather, all elements of the MAGTF support common objectives.
Although specific tasks may differ amongst the different MAGTF elements, operational
and strategic objectives are shared (MCDP 1-0, 1998).
The size and structure of the MAGTF is dependent upon operational
requirements. The largest MAGTF structure is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
There are three standing MEFs during peacetime and war. I MEF is headquartered in
Camp Pendleton, CA; II MEF is headquartered in Camp Lejeune, NC; and III MEF is
headquartered in Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan. The next MAGTF structure is a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), which is smaller than a MEF, but still considered
a "middle-weight" fighting force (MCDP 1-0,1998, p. 3-17). Beyond the MEB, at any
given time, each MEF deploys a sea-based Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is a
forward-deployed, task-organized, sea-based MAGTF operating from naval vessels.
Lastly, a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) may be temporarily formed to fulfill a
variety of missions such as humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery (HA/DR) following
a natural disaster or military operations other than war (MOOTW) (MCDP 1-0, 1998).
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Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) Organization
There are several entities that are assigned to HQMC; however, relevant to this
study, there are some organizations that directly affect Marine Corps C2 systems, as
described in the context of this study. The Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC) is commanded by a Lieutenant General. This general officer is also
dual-appointed as the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC,
CD&I). Within DC, CD&I, the Capability Development Directorate (CDD) consists of
integration divisions organized to address capability gaps across the warfighting
functions. Also organized under MCCDC is the Training and Education Command
(TECOM), which is commanded by a Major General. The primary organization that
provides user-level training on C2 systems is under TECOM, and it is currently directed
by a GS-15. Under the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC), Marine
Corps Systems Command (MCSC) exists to manage acquisitions of new equipment and
oversee programs throughout their life cycle. MCSC is commanded by a Brigadier
General.
Marine Corps Strategic Documents
To maintain itself as a persistent force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps periodically
adjusts its long-term objectives based on guidance set forth by the Department of Defense
(DoD) and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). Marine Corps Vision and Strategy:
2025 (2009a) aims to highlight anticipated threats, and how the Marine Corps should
prepare for the next global crisis through training, equipping, and manning the operating
forces to ensure the Marines are poised to take on the next challenge that lies ahead.
According to Marine Corps Vision and Strategy: 2025, the Marine Corps will "better
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educate and train Marines on the challenges and opportunities presented by the
Information Age so that it becomes inherent in everything we do" (p. 34). The Marine
Corps Service Campaign Plan 2009-2015 (2009b) addresses how the Marine Corps will
address these issues and outlines high-level tasks to prepare for future requirements.
Although the nation's adversaries are often unpredictable, the Marine Corps is able to
determine general regions where instability threatens global commerce and human rights.
The Commandant's Planning Guidance (2010) highlights how the Marine Corps will
achieve readiness objectives to meet the nation's needs in times of crisis. This document
further states that "we will better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed
operations and increasingly complex environments" (p. 12). This document is published
every time a new Commandant is sworn in by the President of the United States.
All of these foundational documents are critical to shaping the future Marine
Corps to ensure readiness at a moment's notice when the nation calls upon the Marine
Corps to respond to a situation, whether it be peacekeeping or high intensity conflict on
the horizon. It is important to note that the Marine Corps does not operate independently.
Most, if not all military operations are joint, in nature, and an increasing number of
military operations are conducted by a multi-national alliance or coalition (MCDP 1-0,
1998). Joint operations references U.S. armed forces operating collaboratively, while
multi-national partnerships, alliances, and coalition operations implies collaborative
efforts of U.S. armed forces and partnering nations. Operating with sister services and the
services of other nations often adds to the complexity of an operation, and it creates
additional requirements to exercise C2 across geographical boundaries and ethnic
cultures.
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Marine Corps Command and Control Doctrine
C2 serves as an overarching warfighting function that enables the sharing of
information among personnel, structure, and equipment across all echelons of the
MAGTF. MCDP 6-0 (1997) provides the foundational knowledge needed to exercise C2
during any crisis or conflict. MCDP 6-0 defines C2 as "the exercise of authority and
direction over assigned and attached forces in support of a mission" (1997, p. A-3). As
the information age has taken shape, the Marine Corps has rapidly embraced technology
across the warfighting functions to distribute and share information across geographically
separate entities of the MAGTF. With this adoption of new technology, problems have
been realized with ensuring Marines know how to optimize the use of these technologies.
Throughout this research, these technologies are generalized as C2 systems. C2 systems
can be broadly compared to information technology (IT) used by any organization. There
are several C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. The use of C2 systems is
primarily driven by billet assignment, vice military occupational specialty (MOS) or
occupational field. In the next section of this literature review, the reader is introduced to
the guiding policy that shapes how the Marine Corps purchases and implements new
capabilities.
Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations
To maintain readiness, the DoD must pursue new technologies to gain a decisive
advantage over our adversaries. Because the DoD is funded by the American taxpayer,
acquisition professionals must exercise diligent practices to ensure that these resources
are well-spent. DOD Directive 5000.1 (2003) establishes the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) to ensure that DoD acquisition policy is both sound and legal. "The
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Defense acquisition system exists to manage the nation's investments in technologies,
programs, and product support necessary to achieve the national security strategy and
support the United States armed forces" (DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003, p. 2). Because
nearly all DoD acquisition initiatives are contracted to the private sector, the FAR
establishes strict guidelines to ensure all contracts are fairly and openly competitive.
The Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS)
The Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System defines the process
DoD components must follow when evaluating its current and future capabilities. This
analysis is driven by desired capabilities, and it is called Capabilities-Based Analysis.
Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System consists of several steps and
processes, which must occur when forwarding new initiatives (CJCSM 3170.01G, 2009).
The first step in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is the
Functional Area Analysis. Regardless of where the Functional Area Analysis originates,
whether it is directed by the DoD, or internal to the service, the outputs remain the same.
Generally, the outputs of the Functional Area Analysis define desired capabilities and
produce a list of associated tasks to achieve this capability.
The second step of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is
the Functional Needs Analysis. Within the Functional Needs Analysis, capability gaps
are identified based on the associated tasks discovered within the Functional Area
Analysis. Additionally, desired timeframes for capabilities are considered to determine
the priority of addressing capability gaps.
The third step of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is the
Functional Solutions Analysis. During the Functional Solutions Analysis, the sponsor
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attempts to mitigate capability gaps through what is known as the DOTMLPF analysis.
DOTMLPF is an acronym for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities. During the DOTMLPF analysis, the services attempt
to mitigate or resolve a capability gap through changing the approach to one, or more, of
these pillars. If the capability gap cannot be resolved through a DOTMLPF change
request (DCR), the sponsor begins the Ideas for Materiel Approaches stage of the
Functional Solutions Analysis. The Ideas for Materiel Approaches consists of
brainstorming and information collection to determine what is currently being done
within the federal government, DoD, and private sector regarding similar or related
technological development. Following the Ideas for Materiel Approaches stage, the
Analysis for Materiel (or non-materiel) Approaches stage begins. During the Analysis for
Materiel Approaches stage, the sponsor will conduct an analysis to determine the best
possible approach to resolve the capability gap. The results of the Analysis for Materiel
Approaches should provide a detailed list of the best approaches to address the gap,
whether it be a DOTMPLF change, a new materiel solution, or both. This list is based on
the information developed during the Functional Needs Analysis. The Functional
Solutions Analysis must address the impact of changing current capabilities, when
technology will be ready to meet the capability gap, and how the DOTMLPF changes
may impact the current operational environment. There are often third-order effects of
making changes that must not be overlooked during the Functional Solutions Analysis.
The final step in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is the
Post-Independent Analysis. This step serves as a check-and-balance to ensure the analysis
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was done thoroughly, did not overlook other initiatives, and the work was done
completely.
Following the Post-Independent Analysis, work will begin to complete a
DOTMLPF Change Request or begin work on an initial capabilities document. The initial
capabilities document outlines the results of the Capabilities-Based Analysis. Within the
initial capabilities document, the capability gap is defined and materiel/non-materiel
solutions are introduced that may resolve that capability gap. Following the initial
capabilities document, the capabilities development document is developed to identify
the performance attributes of a materiel solution required to mitigate a capability gap. If a
materiel solution is not required, the capabilities development document and further
documentation is not required. After the capabilities development document, the
capability production document is produced to identify the concept of operations for the
new materiel solution, a program summary, the number of systems required during each
phase of development, and other associated programmatic information. Each of the Joint
Capabilities and Integration Development System documents is specifically tied to an
acquisition milestone. The initial capabilities document is required for Milestone A; the
capabilities development document is required for Milestone B; the capabilities
production document is required for Milestone C. Each materiel solution is also assigned
an acquisition category (ACAT). Typically, the higher cost of the program, the higher the
ACAT, which requires higher levels of approval prior to proceeding with program
development.
The focal point of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System
relevant to this study is how the capabilities-based analysis is conducted. Within the

Marine Corps, there is an established process to meet the requirements set forth in the
Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System.
Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS)
In response to the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System, the
Marine Corps introduced the Expeditionary Force Development System, which was last
updated in 2008. The Expeditionary Force Development System is divided into four
distinct phases. Phase I addresses the Functional Area Analysis and Functional Needs
Analysis steps as described in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System
(CJCSM 3170.01G, 2009). There are no deviations or additions associated with Phase I.
Phase II begins by conducting the Functional Solutions Analysis, and it addresses a
solutions planning directive (SPD), which addresses how the new solution(s) will be
implemented or how the Marine Corps plans to pursue the required capability.
Additionally, Phase II develops a MAGTF Requirements List (MRL), which identifies
how the Marine Corps will prioritize the desired capability and how the new initiative
will compete for funding in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. Phase
III is the program development phase. At this time, assigned action officers develop
briefings for the Warfighting Investment Program Evaluation Board (WIPEB) and the
Training Program Evaluation Board (PEB). These boards are presented with materials to
inform their decisions on future funding within the POM process. It is important to note
the WIPEB and the Training PEB are two distinct bodies. The Expeditionary Force
Development System concludes during Phase IV. This phase is called Capabilities
Integration and Transition. During Phase IV, performance is monitored to ensure the
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fielded capability is meeting the performance objectives set forth during the Functional
Solutions Analysis (MCO 3900.15B, 2008).
Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP)
In 2008, the Marine Corps established a process to address current missioncritical capability gaps as identified by the operating forces. To initiate the UNP, an
urgent universal needs statement must be endorsed by a general officer and formally
submitted to Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration. Typically,
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment is identified to fill the capability gap, which
circumvents the deliberate expeditionary force development system. Although this
process aids the warfighter by providing a near-term capability, inherent risk is accepted
across the DOTMLPF construct (MCO 3900.17, 2008). While diligently working to help
the warfighter, total life-cycle costs are often underestimated. While some equipment is
relatively easy to use, other solutions may be more complex requiring user training.
Determining who will provide required training and where the money will come from to
support that requirement presents challenges following the original decision to support
the urgent universal needs statement process.
Challenges with Current Acquisition Processes
In 2009, Kerber (2009) of the Defense Science Board Task Force addressed the
House Armed Services Committee regarding defense department acquisition reform. He
cited two major problems with the current policy including: 1) the time it takes to
develop and implement new technologies, and 2) the time it takes to implement new
information technology (IT) within DoD. According to Kerber, it takes twice as long for
the DoD to acquire new IT systems as it does in the private sector. When Marines are
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presented with a new technological development, Gibbs (2009) states that Marines often
refer to a three-year tour, which is typically the length of time a Marine will remain at
one duty station. By the time a new idea is presented, those Marines will have moved on
well before the new technological solution is fielded. In an organization that requires the
newest innovations to maintain a decisive advantage over their adversaries, this is simply
too long (Kotzian, 2010). From the introduction of a new initiative to the time of fielding
to its warfighters, the technology is already outpaced by new technological solutions.
To overcome some of these challenges, Kerber (2009) recommends four distinct
things that can be done differently to address these shortcomings. Potential solutions
identified in this congressional testimony included: 1) buying the right capabilities at the
right time, 2) implementing leadership teams to pay close attention to what we buy, and
how we buy them, 3) reforming the current acquisition process to address different
technological areas, and 4) improving the execution of acquisition policy. All of these
recommendations appear to be well-founded. The third recommendation touches the core
of this study. Broadly applying an acquisition policy to all functional areas is not the best
approach. For example, changes in weaponry do not occur at the same rate of advance as
information technology, yet the same approach is exercised. Some of the weaponry used
in the current Marine Corps has been used for years and still works effectively, while new
IT that was fielded just recently is already outdated. This is particularly problematic
considering that the United States is no longer the most technologically advanced among
technologically literate nation-states. To be better prepared to address the next conflict,
this issue must be addressed to position the U.S. to be best prepared to answer
tomorrow's crisis.
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Further supporting Kerber's (2009) claims, U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued a report in March, 2009, addressing the status of the top acquisition
programs. According to this report, "total research and development costs are now 42
percent higher than originally estimated, and the average delay in delivering initial
capabilities is now 22 months. In addition, 42 percent of the programs reported a 25
percent or more increase in acquisition unit costs" (GAO, 2009, p. 6). More recently,
referring to DoD, a top General was quoted stating " the department is pretty much in the
Stone Age as far as IT is concerned" (Thibodeau, 2011, p. 1). Several reasons for this
problem were cited including proprietary systems, long acquisition timelines, and the
ever-changing world of IT. If high-level officials acknowledge the problem, this further
states the need for change in current policy, and more importantly, execution.
Although some of these challenges can be mitigated through the Urgent Needs
Process, programmatic risk is introduced after the initialfieldingof new equipment. If the
dollar amount of a required capability is relatively high, the required capability must go
through the Expeditionary Force Development System. While this increases development
time, it also ensures the program is handled correctly throughout its life-cycle.
Previously addressed when explaining the Joint Capabilities and Integration
Development System, the DOTMLPF analysis construct was introduced. Regarding new
IT, training is of significant importance. If training is not addressed very early in an
acquisition initiative, the desired capability may result in less than optimal performance.
The next section of this literature review will address Marine Corps training, in general,
followed by specifics of IT and information systems.

Marine Corps Training and Education
Similar to all U.S. armed forces, the Marine Corps has the responsibility to train
and equip its forces to maintain readiness for current and future operations. In How to
Conduct Training (MCRP 3-OB, 1996c), the Marine Corps identifies two types of
training, which include individual training and collective training. Deeply rooted into
Marine Corps ethos, all Marines gain an appreciation for the "train as we fight" concept
(MCRP 3-OB, 1996c, p. 1-1). Placing a heavy emphasis on training and readiness,
training policy states "Marine Corps training is standards-based, performance-oriented,
and prioritized in accordance with mission requirements" (MCRP 3-OB, 1996c, p. A-l).
Training standards are established at the individual and collective levels. To meet this
demand, the Marine Corps has established training and education policy in its Systems
Approach to Training (SAT) Manual (SAT Manual, 2004). To better explain the SAT
process and highlight how to use it, a user's guide was published in 2010 (NAVMC
1553.1,2010).
Marine Corps Systems Approach to Training Manual
The SAT Manual is based on the widely adopted ADDIE model of instructional
system design. ADDIE is an acronym for five phases of curriculum development, which
includes analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate.
During the analyze phase, an occupational field and/or military occupational
specialty asks what that particular community does currently, and how the associated
training meets these tasks. This phase is completed by performing a job analysis and a
task analysis. At the conclusion of the analyze phase, individual training standards are
identified and considered for incorporation into training during the next phase.
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The design phase compares the newly identified list of individual training
standards with the current learning objectives addressed by formal schools. Formal
schools are recognized as such by the Marine Corps. Some provide entry-level training or
military occupational specialty (MOS) training, while others provide Professional
Military Education (PME), which varies according to rank. At this time, decisions are
made to determine what changes are required to existing instruction to incorporate the list
of individual training standards. Additionally, the formal school identifies the target
population description, updates learning objectives and sequence, selects delivery
methods, and writes test items (SAT Manual, 2004).
During the development phase, instructional materials are developed or modified,
course schedules are developed, course descriptive data is developed to support the
training, and the program of instruction is completed. The course descriptive data and
program of instruction serve as the overarching curriculum documents on which funding
decisions are made.
The implement phase consists of instructor preparation and content delivery to
ensure a transfer of knowledge from instructor to student. With newly modified programs
of instruction, this phase is often repeated making minor changes to ensure the materials
are best delivered to enable student success.
Lastly, although very important, the evaluate phase is implemented on a recurring
basis. This phase addresses both formative and summative assessments in an attempt to
address overall course effectiveness (NAVMC 1553.1, 2010). Although the evaluate
phase is clearly identified in the SAT Manual, many formal schools do not perform
training program evaluation beyond student reaction. This is partly due to access to

former students, but it is also due to training organizations not being held accountable for
their own assessment and evaluation efforts (MAGTF-TC, 2010).
Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness Manual Program
The Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness Manual Program was
established in 2005 to identify training standards and policy in all occupational fields
within the Marine Corps (MCO P3500.72A, 2005). The training and readiness process
began in the aviation community and as a result of its success, Training and Education
Command determined that this model would serve the Ground Combat Element and
Logistics Combat Element just as well. Each occupational field now has its own training
and readiness manual, which establishes the tasks, conditions, and standards required to
perform each mission-essential task relevant to that occupational field.
Training and readiness manuals are written to address individual core capabilities
up to and including unit core capabilities to perform the various missions that a particular
type of unit may encounter. The training and readiness manual is the cornerstone
document from which individual skills are developed within a military occupational
specialty community. The training and readiness manual shapes training at formal
schools and unit training as they prepare for deployment into harm's way. The training
and readiness manuals are routinely updated to incorporate newly required skills and
remove outdated material.
Some challenges with the training and readiness manual system exist due to the
fact that there are typically multiple occupational fields represented in any single unit.
Commanders must ensure that time is made available to address individual training
requirements of Marines and Sailors from different occupational fields while still

accomplishing unit training objectives. During pre-deployment training, this balance is
often difficult to achieve. Entry-level training, alone, may not be enough for the
individual Marine to form and further-develop required skills and adopt an increased
level of responsibility. For that reason, the commander must find a balance in achieving
individual training objectives while preparing for overall unit success in a given mission.
Force Generation Process
In 2010, the Marine Corps published Marine Corps Order 3502.6, which
establishes a service-wide force generation process. The intent of this order is to focus the
efforts of manning, equipping, and training units that are preparing to deploy. It also
establishes service-level pre-deployment training requirements (MCO 3502.6, 2010). As
currently written, the pre-deployment training program is conducted on a four-block
construct. Block one addresses individual training; block two addresses collective, smallunit training; block three addresses advanced collective training at the battalion-level; and
block four consists of a mission rehearsal exercise, which is intended to serve as an
overall assessment of the deploying unit's proficiency. The assessment is conducted by a
training entity working under the Training and Education Command. The success or
failure of units during the pre-deployment training program rests with the unit
commander; however, if the unit is not properly manned, trained, and equipped, the unit
is not positioned to perform well during the assessment period (MAGTF-TC, 2010). C2
system training is not currently mandated during the pre-deployment training program,
therefore, this is made available to unit commanders, but they are not required to send
their Marines to the training prior to their mission rehearsal exercise and/or deployment.
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Training Program Evaluation
This section of the literature review broadly addresses training program
evaluation challenges and strategies to mitigate those issues. To determine the best way
to address evaluation, there may be something learned from the private sector. In 2008,
American corporations spent approximately $134 billion on employee training programs
(Baun & Scott, 2010). Despite these high expenditures, many organizations do not
recognize the need for training program evaluation (Lingham, Richley, & Rezania, 2006).
This is partly due to the fact that training programs rarely produce measurable data which
would prove the value of the training investment (Pineda, 2010). One reason these data
are not produced is due to the lack of indicators of training effectiveness. According to
Praslova (2010), selecting appropriate indicators of training effectiveness is difficult for
organizations if the criteria to measure effectiveness are not well defined. This leads to
the root of the problem. To ensure effective training, the training provider must
implement training program evaluation.
Implementing Training Program Evaluation
Although a challenging task, assessing the value of training programs must be
incorporated into the needs assessment stages of a training program. It is also important
that leadership buy-in to the idea of assessing the training program early in the
development phase (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010). As highlighted by Brauchle and
Schmidt (2004), one training program evaluation model, which has gained wide
acceptance, is Kirkpatrick's model, first introduced in 1979. Kirkpatrick's model includes
four levels of evaluation which address student reaction; knowledge, skills, and attitudes;
behavior; and results. Even though the Kirkpatrick model represents a solution for
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organizations which have yet to implement training program evaluations, relatively few
organizations are doing so. According to Sims (1993), organizations either lack the
knowledge in creating a useful evaluation method or they do not recognize the need for
an effective evaluation tool. With relatively high expenditures on training initiatives and
programs, this area has significant room for improvement.
Determining Training Effectiveness
Corporations that do implement training program evaluation typically utilize
Return on Investment (ROI) methods to measure effectiveness (Brauchle & Schmidt,
2004). ROI can be measured in several different ways, but most are directly tied to
employee performance following the training. For example, time saved, or increased
output can be compared to a dollar figure. For organizations in fields where production
cannot be easily measured, ROI may not be the best metric (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2010). Additionally, public sector organizations cannot easily equate ROI as a strong
measure of a training program's success (Sims, 1993).
Whether private or public sector, organizations should strive for constant
improvement to new and/or existing training programs. Sims (1993) conducted a case
study to determine why evaluations were not widely conducted in public sector training
programs. During this study, Sims found that there was no shared understanding about
what should be included in a course evaluation. Sims further suggested that evaluation of
training is often difficult and time-consuming; program administrators assume that the
training will be sufficient; and lastly, administrators who champion the training may feel
threatened by an objective evaluation that may discredit the training program (1993).
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Training programs often present dynamic challenges. Training development must
not be viewed as a snapshot in time, but, rather, addressed continuously to ensure
students are receiving the best possible training product within reasonable resource
constraints (Praslova, 2010). The dynamic nature of establishing training programs
highlights potential barriers to the implementation of effective evaluation tools, which is
most likely seen in both, public and private-sector organizations (Sims, 1993).
Organizational leadership must champion training initiatives if resources are to be
applied to making improvements (Pineda, 2010). Sims' findings identify an
organizational change problem, which is outside of the scope of this study, but worthy of
analysis on a larger scale (1993).
Using the Kirkpatrick model, it is necessary to determine which level of training
is being evaluated. The same evaluation cannot be widely applied across all four levels
because each level would identify different results. According to Kirkpatrick and
Kirkpatrick (2010), organizations must determine the evidence that would be required at
each of the four levels to show a training program was successful. When measurement
methods, tools, and techniques are clearly defined at the start of an initiative evaluation is
much easier to perform (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010). For example, evaluating
training according to Level I of the Kirkpatrick model would assess student reaction,
while Level III would assess demonstrated student behaviors. This being said, the
question still remains: what is an effective training evaluation model which can be widely
used?
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Implementing an Effective Evaluation Method
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2010) assert that ROI may not be the best metric for
evaluating training programs. They contend that return on expectations (ROE) is a better
metric. ROE is an evaluation method that begins with trainers having an understanding of
the desired learning outcomes. Additionally, trainers have stakeholder buy-in that have a
vested interest in the success of the training program. By including training
representatives in the decision-making process, trainers will have an idea of the priority
of the initiative, which is often tied to resources (Sims, 1993).
Managing a training program is an active and ongoing task. What was adequate
yesterday may or may not be relevant today. Organizational leaders and trainers must
continuously evaluate their own curriculum, change the content, and incorporate
feedback based on course evaluations (Pineda, 2010). If these procedures are not
conducted, a training program can very quickly be viewed by the training audience as
irrelevant. Seeking constant improvement of course content and delivery is an inherent
responsibility of the training organization that must be exercised to maintain currency
(Sims, 1993).
When trying to determine students' perceptions of a training program, Fast (1974)
suggests addressing the measuring of attitudes and behaviors following a training event.
Behaviors and attitudes are often difficult to measure immediately following training;
therefore, accurate evaluation may or may not adequately measure effectiveness
(Brauchle & Schmidt, 2004). However, Fast (1974) suggests that if the trainees will not
be directly observed following the training, the organizational leadership responsible for
generating the evaluation can incorporate open-ended questions to attempt to derive

patterns and trends from the trainees. These types of questions typically enable the
trainers to gain more insight into what the trainees were thinking after the training has
taken place. The suggestions made by Fast are specifically evaluating learner reaction,
which is Level I in Kirkpatrick's model. By thinking through the evaluation process on
the front end, an organization can establish better curriculum leading toward achieving
the desired learning outcomes of the organizational leadership (Lingham, Richley, &
Rezania, 2006).
Although a significant amount of resources are allocated to training, little
evidence of effective training evaluation exists (Lingham, Richley, & Rezania, 2006).
Evaluation must be developed up front as an integral component of training program
development (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010). This practice forces the training
organization to establish widely understood and broadly accepted course content. Course
evaluation must be implemented to incorporate feedback from the training audience,
while organizational leaders that are responsible for the training must develop desired
learning outcomes at the onset of program development (Brauchle & Schmidt, 2004). If
the process is overly complex, it will most likely lose momentum. Lastly, leadership must
champion these efforts. If not, it will be very difficult to make noteworthy improvements
that are reinforced by positive course evaluations (Praslova, 2010). Following these
procedures, the trainers can ensure they are teaching a quality product that is beneficial to
the trainees, relevant to the current operating environment, and has the ability to achieve
the desired end-state of the organizational leadership.

35
Developing an Information Systems Strategy
In the mid-1990's, a new term was introduced in the field of information systems
or IT management called enterprise resource planning. Macris (2011) defines an
enterprise resource planning system as "a set of highly integrated applications, consisting
of applications modules, which can be used to manage most of the business functions
within an organization" (p. 1450). Although the benefits of implementing an enterprise
resource planning system can be significant, Macris claims that the training requirements
for the users may present a steep learning curve. Beyond training challenges, the
successful system implementation phase, in itself, is often a major roadblock to the
success of an enterprise resource planning system.
Many companies around the world were eager to implement an enterprise system
to enable shared data across departmental lines. While this can be helpful, particularly for
a global operation, it can also present significant technological and operational
challenges. As stated previously, many global IT or information system implementations
fail miserably (Clegg, 1988). An enterprise system has the ability to solve the gap in
proprietary systems and enable streamlined efficiencies, but only if the implementation
strategy is well-developed and communicated across the organization. As a result of
studying several large companies, Pollais (2003) supports similar claims stating that ITintensive organizations can only be successful if information system strategies are
carefully integrated across all functional areas.
According to a study conducted by Chen, Mocker, Preston, and Teubner (2010),
IS strategy is a term routinely used among organizations, but its meaning is not clearly
articulated. Davis (2000) states that there are multiple components collectively addressed

by an information system strategy which include the IT infrastructure, data, software
applications, and IT personnel. Other research indicates that the information system
strategy must also address the planning, design, and implementation of the systems,
themselves (Davis, 2000). Somewhere between these two ideologies, it appears that the
information system strategy must not only address the technical side, but the business
process aspects of information systems, as well. Following their research, Chen et al.
(2010) define an information system strategy as "the organizational perspective on the
investment in, deployment, use, and management of information systems" (p. 237).
Davenport (1998) claims that organizations must consider the business impact of
implementing an enterprise system. If the technology changes the operation, the
enterprise system may not be well-received by the people using the software. Another
major consideration when implementing an enterprise system is how legacy systems will
be affected. If the enterprise system will replace legacy systems, leadership and
technologists must collaboratively address how this will impact business operations.
Davenport further states "if a company's systems are fragmented, its business is
fragmented" (p. 123). Although an enterprise system may appear to be a panacea,
businesses implementing an enterprise system may have to modify their business
processes to fit the system, which may not be the desired effect (Davenport, 1998).
Within the Marine Corps, an enterprise system may help to mitigate some of the
challenges presented by several proprietary, legacy systems that do not adequately share
information across the warfighting functions. If the Marine Corps were to make this
consideration, its leaders must prioritize the operational impacts over technological
capability.

In 2004, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) chartered a study to evaluate
effective IT training practices among leaders from private industry. Powner (2004) found
that "agencies reported that the most common obstacles to effective training are funding
and the time that training takes away from normal work hours" (p. 2). This becomes an
issue of priorities and time available. As IT increases in complexity, there is a direct
correlation with the required time to train. If users do not know how to operate the
application, its utility will most certainly be diminished. How can this problem be
addressed? Powner (2004) found that there were several training management practices
that were widely used by private industry. Of those, organizations of the federal
government centered around five key IT training management processes. These processes
included the following:
•

aligning IT training with strategic goals;

•

identifying and assessing IT training needs;

•

allocating IT training resources;

•

designing and delivering IT training; and,

•

evaluating/demonstrating the value of IT training.

During the assessment stage of determining IT requirements, an organization could gain
by incorporating these guidelines. To truly understand the costs associated with
implementing the appropriate training plan, a training expert must be included in the
decision-making process. If this is overlooked, a major adjustment to the budget should
be anticipated to correct training shortfalls. If not, an organization should expect limited
utility of the IT solution.
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In a study conducted by Strassman (2003), DoD IT spending was evaluated.
Citing a GAO report, the 2002 IT budget exceeded $26 billion. Problem areas were cited
stating that DoD tends to develop one application at a time, which typically results in
redundant, stove-piped applications, meaning they are planned without considering
interoperability (Strassman, 2003). Strassman further claims that investing in a better IT
infrastructure would improve the success rate of application development and
implementation. Strassman went on to say that there are three primary areas for the
improvement of the DoD acquisitions process, which included: 1) determining what
applications can be delivered immediately; 2) aligning business processes with goals of
improving infrastructure; and 3) developing a strategy for transition from legacy IT
applications. If these goals are not met, the DoD will continue to make IT decisions
independent of one another, driving up costs, and undermining warfighter capability. It
appears that most industry experts believe that an enterprise IT strategy is more cost
effective over time. While independent efforts may solve a temporary problem, they may
result in long-term challenges across the enterprise.
Responding to Organizational Change as a Result of New IT
The global, knowledge-based economy requires innovative approaches, smart
logistics, and constant adaptability to both competition and customer demands.
Organizations must be able to make quick decisions as challenges arise. Additionally,
organizations must expect change and deal with it accordingly. The company that
chooses the status quo without any external focus is typically the one that falls behind
the competition. As the free market continues to evolve, businesses must stay ahead of
their competitors. While many long-term employees resist what is often considered just
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another bright idea, some of the newer and potentially younger employees may welcome
the change. Warrilow (2004) states that management is often too disconnected from its
employees and most of the company's natural leaders are not leaders within the formal
hierarchy. This is the primary reason for animosity between workers and management
during times of change. However, it seems that the one constant in the free market is
change (Kettinger, Teng, & Guha, 1997). Leaders should anticipate change, recognizing
that new ideas, approaches, and strategies are what keep their business afloat. No longer
can only a good product carry the burden of profitability. It is more about the logistics of
transforming products from raw materials to finished products in the hands of the
customer. To do this effectively and efficiently requires constant change.
This kind of change requires smart implementation approaches, and rather than
swiftly altering employees' world of work, there has to be a strategy in place so workers
are not surprised. This kind of surprise is typically not well-received. Leaders must be
trained on the implementation of major changes in the workplace. Zaccaro and Banks
(2004) suggest that change management skills must be developed into core
competencies. Many managers may dismiss this topic as unimportant. Considering that
employee turnover has an adverse effect on profitability, perhaps introducing major
workplace changes with a well-developed strategy is in the best interest of the company,
at large. Managers must embrace change, know that it is coming, and train personnel on
how to effectively implement change within the organization.
Prior to implementing change, management must be able to make timely,
effective decisions that serve the best interest of the organization. Quite frequently, there
is not enough time, or there is missing information. These are the obvious challenges to
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making decisions. Sayegh, Anthony, and Perrewe (2004) claim that improved decisionmaking skills can be developed if leaders understand an individual's emotions while
making a decision. How people view a problem provides some insight into why certain
choices are selected. Understanding these different emotions can help teach decisionmaking skills by re-creating problems requiring an immediate decision. However, in the
real world, many critics believe that decision-makers should be those with experience.
Experienced leaders often make decisions based on their instinct. Because they may
have seen and dealt with many difficult situations previously, it typically makes the next
problem that much more reasonable to resolve. Heskett (2010) asks what is the right mix
between intuition and analysis? It would be great to conduct a thorough analysis, but
typically due to time constraints, this is not feasible. Teaching decision-making skills
has potential if a realistic environment can be re-created to simulate the workplace and
its unique stressors. If the environment cannot be replicated, a high state of emotions is
unlikely to be achieved. Change management must be wisely implemented to avoid any
unnecessary animosity among employees. Decision-making skills can be developed
through experience, which results in intuition. They can be taught to individuals if the
stressors of the workplace environment can be replicated. If not, emotions will not tell us
how we will react, because they are not the same as they would be in reality.
In a study conducted by Chiara and Vincenzo (2008), researchers attempted to
identify if new IT increased productivity. While previous research indicates that
performance may be increased if IT training is incorporated, organizational change
measures may have a greater effect than training, alone. In this study, 466 small to
medium Italian companies were surveyed to determine if absorptive capacity has an

41
effect on productivity. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define absorptive capacity as an
organization's ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit external knowledge to increase
profitability. The researchers determined that absorptive capacity does have a positive
effect on increased productivity regarding new IT. Companies that were able to use the
new IT to change processes or develop new approaches to solving problems
demonstrated higher results. This study indicates that successful implementation of IT
involved much more than merely the technology, itself. Where training was provided on
the new software, and where change management strategies were introduced, better
results were found through survey data.
According to a study by Kettinger et al. (1997) business process re-engineering
has taken off due to several factors; one of which is the rapid development of new IT.
Through interviews with 25 different companies, they found that there were several
different methods, techniques, and tools used when implementing business process reengineering initiatives, but there were some common themes identified when selecting
new IT. The companies that addressed these common themes showed greater success
when implementing new IT, and IT-based business process re-engineering initiatives
within their organization. The first issue addressed the dimension of the entity, which
included whether the IT would be used internally, cross-departmentally, or to
communicate with external organizations. Next, different objects were addressed,
highlighting if the object was physical or informational. Lastly, desired activities were
introduced, which addressed what the organization hoped to achieve through the use of
the new IT. These three, together, were cited as common issues addressed when
implementing IT-based business process re-engineering initiatives. These three areas
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enable the organization to best-determine what will meet their needs prior to making a
purchase decision. When implementing new IT within an organization, there are often
challenges presented beyond the technical difficulty of the new application. To overcome
these challenges, organizations must be prepared to manage the organizational change
requirements well before a new information system is presented. Bellamy (2007) states
"The rapid speed of technological development and its effect on organizational strategy,
structure, and processes has created a critical need for a systematic approach to managing
technology" (p. 32). Beyond the technology, users must be properly trained on how to
use a system prior to its implementation. Chiara and Vincenzo (2008) refer to this aspect
of organizational change as managing the learning process. Organizations that have the
ability to manage their learning processes are more inclined to integrate business
processes within an IT strategy.
According to a study conducted by Kee-Young and Hee-Woong (2008), the
failure rate of enterprise system implementation is typically due to reasons other than
technical problems. This leads one to believe that the technology may be ready, but the
organization may not be ready, resulting in challenges. One of the key components of the
study conducted by Kee-Young and Hee-Woong was to assess the willingness of
employees to use a new enterprise system. The results of the study indicated that the
employees' readiness for change was a significant contributor to the success of a new
enterprise system. This so-called readiness for change was a direct result of user training.
Kertinger et al. (1997) further state that while IT professionals should be involved
in business process re-engineering efforts, they may lack awareness of strategic goals and
objectives of the organization. IT personnel must be read into the daily activities and
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broader organizational objectives to gain a true understanding of where the organization
is going. With this knowledge, they may be able to see room for process improvement
that other leaders cannot see or understand. Chung-Jen (2007) conducted a study to
determine the effects of cross-functional teams on new product development. The results
suggest that the influence of cross-functional teams was significant on the successful
development of new products. Pulling in team members from across functional domains
can have a positive effect on developing and forwarding new initiatives. Martinsons,
Davison, and Martinsons (2009) claim that a key contributor to an IT-enabled
organizational change is the culture in which the change is taking place. Considering the
cultural style of the organization should be addressed during the planning stages of
change implementation. If not, it is unlikely the change initiative will be well-received by
those most affected. Introducing IT applications without considering cultural norms
introduces unnecessary risk. To mitigate this risk, Martinsons, Davison, and Martinsons
suggest getting the support of the primary stakeholders prior to introducing the new IT
application (2009). While this seems like an obvious element in a successful IT
implementation, this is often overlooked. Within many organizations, IT professionals
attempt to determine what is best for the users without getting critical input prior to
implementation. This causes resistance to change and often puts leadership at odds with
the user community. Determining return-on-investment (ROI) of IT systems has been
difficult for many organizations for quite some time. Leaders want to know the true value
of their IT investments (Serafeimidis & Smithson, 2000). Most IT evaluation has looked
at technological aspects without considering the human and organizational components,
collectively (Serafeimidis & Smithson, 2000). Without considering all contributors in an
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evaluation of IT, the true ROI can be difficult to determine. Bellamy (2007) states that
effective planning directly impacts a new technology's success during implementation.
Before an organization can place value on an information system, they must ask
themselves if the users were part of the planning process. If they were not, conducting an
IT evaluation may be somewhat premature. For these reasons, an implementation
strategy, to include user input and training must be built into the process prior to
implementation. Following a period of time after the initial implementation, evaluation
can begin to take place.
A significant challenge the Marine Corps faces in implementing C2 systems is
that purchase decisions have been made independently of one another across the different
warfighting functions. Some are owned and used specifically by an occupational field,
while others are broadly used throughout the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
This results in proprietary systems across the warfighting functions that are not inherently
interoperable with other systems, nor are they easy for the warfighter to use. While the
functionality of the system may meet the immediate needs of an occupational field, others
may gain from the same information. If nobody owns these issues, holistically, across the
warfighting functions, there is no strategic vision to drive user training.
Summary
The Marine Corps has a very unique culture and a diverse mission-type. Due to
current acquisition policy it is often difficult to predict what IT solution will be required
and exactly when to purchase new capabilities. By reviewing some of the fundamental
practices of IT professionals in the private sector, the Marine Corps may be able to
overcome some of these challenges and build a true enterprise C2 system that is
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adaptable to a constantly-changing mission. Beyond the IT itself, user training must be
planned early in the project's life-cycle, and the quality of training must constantly be
addressed through training program evaluation. If the Marine Corps hopes to maintain an
information advantage over its adversaries, its C2 system procurement and training
policies must be addressed through a holistic view. When making purchase decisions,
change management strategies must be developed to determine how the new IT solution
will work within a legacy C2 architecture. If any of these components are not addressed,
the Marine Corps will continue to face challenges in its ability to conduct C2. Chapter III
explains the research design and addresses the methods and procedures used to conduct
this study.

CHAPTER HI
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Recent After-Action Reports of units returning from deployment indicate that
they were not as well prepared to utilize C2 systems as they needed to be prior to
deployment (MAGTF-TC, 2010). Because the Marine Corps spends a significant amount
of money every year to maintain and operate legacy C2 applications and acquire new and
improved C2 applications, this study is important to determine if the perceptions of the
warfighters are similar to that of the leaders who make key decisions affecting the future
of C2 applications used by the Marines on the ground. The purpose of this study was to
identify potential barriers to the effective employment of C2 systems to enhance
warfighter readiness. In Chapter III the following topics will be discussed: population,
research design, instrument design, data collection method, and statistical analysis.
Population
The total number of Marines and civilians from Headquarters, Marine Corps and
the Supporting Establishment affecting C2 system procurement and training is much
smaller than that of the users in the Operating Forces; therefore, the sample population of
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment was fewer than that of the
Operating Forces. Purposeful sampling was utilized to select participants from
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment who are relatively senior
leaders contributing to decision-making in terms of purchasing, implementing, and
training C2 applications within the Marine Corps. Participation was requested from parts
of Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat Development & Integration, Marine Corps
Systems Command, and Training and Education Command. Participants from the

Operating Forces were limited to Mannes within infantry units. This population was
selected because they are the primary users of the C2 systems addressed in this study.
The total population of potential participants from Headquarters, Marine Corps
and the Supporting Establishment is approximately 200 people. Participants from
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment were invited to participate
based on organization, billet, and grade. This consisted of Marines who are a Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) and above. Civilian employees included in this study
were GS12 through GS15.
The total population of potential participants from the Operating Forces is
approximately 5,000 people. Marines within infantry units were invited to participate in
the grades of SNCO and above. Rank/Grade was included as a sampling criterion in this
study because Marines and civilians of these grades are most likely more aware of the
issues being addressed in this study than that of junior Marines. The objective was to get
approximately 400 responses from the Operating Forces and 100 from Headquarters,
Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment.
Research Design
This study compared and contrasted perspectives and attitudes of Marines and
civilian leaders from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment
(Combat Development & Integration, Systems Command, and Training and Education
Command) and infantry Marines from the Operating Forces through survey research. Hoi
addressed whether or not there is a difference in the perception of effective employment
of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. H02-H05 addressed
relationships between different demographic characteristics and the relative perception of

the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems. These demographic
characteristics included occupational field (H02), experience (H03), rank (H04), and lastly,
recent deployment experience (H05).
The two primary groups of the study included: 1) personnel (Marine and Civilian
leadership) from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment and 2)
Marines from the Operating Forces. To address Hoi, the independent variables (IV) were
the Marine Corps components consisting of Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting
Establishment, and the Operating Forces. The dependent variable (DV) was their
perception and/or attitude about the effective employment of C2 systems across the
DOTMLPF construct. To address H02 - H05, the IV were the different demographic
characteristics of respondents, while the DV was perception and/or attitude about the
effective employment of C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct.
Instrument Design
Following a review of literature related to the purchase, training, and
implementation of new IT and associated challenges, a survey was developed to address
these common themes within the population of this study. The Marine Corps commonly
addresses issues using the DOTMLPF construct; therefore, the survey was developed
addressing the primary issues found in the literature within the DOTMLPF construct.
Data were collected by conducting a survey consisting of 25 questions. Twenty-four
questions were closed-ended, while one question was open-ended. This question, in
particular, asked the respondent to write in their occupational field as a four-digit
number. Survey questions 1 - 5 ask demographic information to establish groups. Table 1
identifies the primary issues found in the literature, references, and survey questions

6 - 2 5 . Survey questions 6 - 2 5 used a five-point Likert-scale to determine if the
participants strongly disagreed, slightly disagreed, were neutral, slightly agreed, or
strongly agreed with each statement presented within the questions. The survey
instrument can be found in Appendix B.
Table 1
Survey instrument design
References
Doctrine
(Chung-Jen, 2007)
(Benamati, & Lederer, 2001)
(Strassmann, 2003)
(Shore, 2006)

Organization
(Baun& Scott, 2010)
(Chiara & Vincenzo, 2008)
(Clegg, 1998)
(Powner, 2004)

Training
(Brauchle & Schmidt, 2004)
(Fast, 1974)
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010)
(Lingham, Richley, & Rezania, 2006)
(Patton, 2002)
(Pineda, 2010)
(Praslova,2010)
(Sims, 1993)

Survey Questions
6.
Current Marine Corps doctrine
provides sufficient guidance to effectively
employ C2 systems.
7.
Marine Corps doctrine accurately
reflects C2 employment practices
witnessed in current operations.
8. Current tables of equipment (T/E)
support the effective employment of C2
systems.
9.
Current tables of organization (T/O)
support the effective employment of C2
systems.
10. C2 system training is an important
component of pre-deployment training.
11.
Current C2 system training
adequately supports the effective
employment of C2 systems in an
operational environment.
12. C2 system training should be
mandated within the pre-deployment
training program (PTP).
13.
C2 system training is adequately
emphasized throughout PTP, including
individual and collective training and
mission rehearsal exercises.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Survey instrument design
References

Survey Questions
14. Marines are generally
knowledgeable of what C2 system
training is available at home-station.
15. Marines are knowledgeable on
the C2 Training Continuum.

Materiel
(Clegg, 1998)
(Powner, 2004)

Leadership and Education
(Hill & Friday-Stroud, 2009)
(Langer, 2005)

Personnel
(Heskett, 2010)
(Kettinger, Teng, & Guha, 1997)
(Warrilow, 2010)
(Zaccaro & Banks, 2004)
(Kee-Young, & Hee-Woong, 2008)
(Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004)

Facilities
(Gomolski, 2006)
(Grant, 2003)

16.
Current C2 systems adequately
support current operations.
17. There is a widespread understanding
of the capabilities of C2 systems across the
warfighting functions.
18.
C2 system training should be
incorporated into professional military
education (PME) programs.
19. Unit leaders are knowledgeable
about how to best employ C2 systems in an
operational environment.
20. A primary MOS should be
established to provide dedicated C2 system
operators.
21.
C2 operator structure should be
sourced from within the infantry
occupational field.
22.
Currently, COC personnel are
adequately trained to perform their assigned
billet prior to deployment.
23.
COC staff members across the
warfighting functions are assigned to a unit
with enough time to conduct PTP with other
unit members.
24.
Current combat operations center
(COC) equipment adequately supports
effective C2.
25.
Units are adequately trained to
proficiently install, operate, and maintain
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Validity
External validity was controlled by developing survey questions addressing
common issues found within an organization utilizing Information Technology (IT)
within their business processes. Questions were formed by asking questions of the sample
groups that can be comparable to questions asked of management and end-users of IT
within any organization, whether public or private. See Table 2. The survey questions
asked of both groups contained the same content to ensure the results could be compared
to one another.
Table 2
Addressing external validity in survey instrument
U.S. Marine Corps
Doctrine
Organization
Training
Materiel
Leadership and Education
Personnel
Facilities

Private Sector
Guiding Policy, Business Strategy
Organizational Hierarchy, Structure
User Training, Administrator Training
Hardware, Software, Network Infrastructure
Stakeholder Buy-in and Understanding
Enough People? The Right People?
Where is the IT solution used?

To address internal validity, content and construct of the survey were reviewed by
an expert panel prior to survey administration. Prior to meeting with the expert panel,
they were given instructions, which are located in Appendix C. This expert panel
consisted of five retired Marine Corps field grade officers who have several years of
experience in the Marine Corps and currently serve as defense contractors in the area of
C2. The panel reviewed all survey questions and made recommended changes to clarify
the content. This panel reviewed the original survey, located in Appendix A. Based on
their recommendations questions were modified to ensure clarity; however, the content
within the questions did not change. The revised survey is available in Appendix B.
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Reliability
To ensure reliability, a pilot survey was administered prior to data collection to
ensure internal consistency within the survey. The pilot study included 25 participants
across the population and was administered in December 2011. Using Cronbach's alpha,
internal consistency was determined to be .885, which is considered good if greater than
.80 (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & Barrett, 2004). No questions were removed as a result
of this analysis. The secondary objective of the pilot study was to ensure the survey was
functional via the web link that was provided. Based on a 100% response rate and
complete data the survey worked as intended.
Data Collection Method
To gain interest in this study, the leadership of several organizations within
Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Supporting Establishment, and the Operating Forces
were contacted via electronic mail and telephone to explain the objective of this study
and ask for their participation. If the leaders agreed to participate, they received an email
message explaining the objective of the study and the population that would be sampled
(see Appendix D). At the time of data collection, they were sent another email message
with the survey web link to simplify distribution to Staff Non-commissioned Officers,
Officers, and civilian employees within their respective organizations (see Appendix E).
At the request of several organizational leaders, the survey was made available for
a thirty-day period to ensure statistical significance. Following the initial survey
participation invitation, organizational leaders received a reminder email following ten
business days if responses had not significantly increased. Another reminder email was
sent if responses had not significantly increased after twenty days from the initial
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invitation. Lastly, a final reminder was sent out three days prior to the end of the data
collection period. Following the thirty-day period, statistical analysis began.
Statistical Analysis
This study used quantitative analysis based on the responses to the web-based
survey that was previously distributed to organizational leadership. Other than the initial
five demographic questions and one open-ended question regarding occupational field,
the survey questions used a five-point Likert-scale. Descriptive statistics including
number of responses, group means, and standard deviations were determined for each
survey question. Further statistical analysis was conducted using Predictive Analytics
Software (PASW) Statistics GradPack 18.0.0. To address Hoi and H05 a Mest was used to
compare and contrast sample group means of survey responses to questions spanning
across the DOTMPLF construct. To address H02, H03, and H04, one-way ANOVA was
utilized to determine if there was a relationship between different demographic
characteristics and the way the respondents answered the survey questions across the
DOTMLPF construct.
Summary
The population within this study consisted of those who develop, purchase, and
train C2 system use and the warfighters who use C2 systems during combat operations.
Guided by five research hypotheses, the independent variables consisted of different
demographic characteristics, while the dependent variable was the perception of the
effective employment of C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. A survey was
developed based on the literature, which was then presented in the form of the
DOTMLPF construct. The survey was reviewed by an expert panel, which recommended

some minor grammatical corrections to ensure clarity. A pilot study consisting of 25
participants was conducted to address reliability measures. Using Cronbach's alpha, the
survey scored a .885, which is considered good when equal to or greater than .80.
Statistical methods used during this study included the /-test for Hoi and H05. One-way
ANOVA was used to address H02, H03, and H04.
Chapter IV will identify the findings of the study. Descriptive statistics will be
provided for each survey question, which will be followed by statistically significant
findings based on the five hypotheses, if applicable.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
This chapter explains the results of this quantitative study, which was conducted
during the months of December 2011 and January 2012. The chapter begins by
addressing the response rate within the population. This is followed by a section on
demographics, which also addresses the descriptive statistics found in the first five
questions of the survey. An explanation of the coding used in the study is provided.
Descriptive statistics for the remaining 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct are
addressed, which is followed by remarks on internal consistency. Lastly, statistically
significant findings throughout the five research hypotheses are provided.
Response Rate
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective
employment of command and control (C2) systems to enhance warfighter readiness.
Using a web-based survey tool, purposeful sampling from organizations within the target
population resulted in 583 total responses; however, 32 respondents did not complete all
of the questions. Incomplete data were discarded, which resulted in a sample size of 551.
To achieve statistical significance, 357 responses were required from the
Operating Forces, based on a total population of approximately 5,000. Within
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment 132 responses were
required, based on approximately 200 Marines and civilians working in applicable
organizations (Patten, 2005) directly having an impact on this subject. There were 385
responses provided from the Operating Forces, while 166 responses were provided by
members of Headquarters Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. Therefore,

the sample size from both organizations met the criteria to provide statistical significance
at a 95% confidence interval. The response rate from the Operating Forces was
approximately 8%, while the response rate from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the
Supporting Establishment was much higher, representing nearly 83%. The total response
rate was approximately 11%.
Demographic Characteristics
The first five survey questions addressed demographic information to determine
each respondent's rank, experience, occupational field, whether or not they have recently
deployed, and their current organizational assignment. With the exception of government
civilians, making up only 4.9% of the respondents, rank distribution among uniformed
Marines was fairly well-balanced ranging from 27.0% to 34.3% for each category. The
group having between 12 and 20 years of service provided 44.5% of the total responses.
Other than this, experience varied widely across the ranks. The infantry occupational
field provided 73.3% of the responses. All other occupational fields accounted for less
than 10% each. This was to be expected because the infantry community was the primary
target audience of the survey. The Operating Forces provided 69.9% of the responses,
while Marines and civilian employees from Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) and
the Supporting Establishment (SE) provided 30.1%. Lastly, 78.9% of the survey
participants claimed to have been forward-deployed in support of real-world operations
within the 36 months prior to completing this survey. Demographic characteristics are
shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Demographic characteristics of survey participants (n=551)
Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percentage

Rank
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians
Total

149
186
189
27
551

27.0
33.8
34.3
4.9
100.0

Experience
0 - 4 Years
>4 - 8 Years
>8 - 12 Years
> 1 2 - 2 0 Years
>20 Years
Total

6
112
63
245
125
551

1.1
20.3
11.4
44.5
22.7
100.0

Occupational Field
Infantry (03XX)
Other Combat Arms
Intelligence (02XX)
Logistics (04XX)
Communications (06XX)
Other
Total

404
22
51
23
23
28
551

73.3
4.0
9.3
4.2
4.2
5.1
100.0

Recent Deployment
Yes
No
Total

435
116
551

78.9
21.1
100.0

Organization
Operating Forces
HQMC/SE
Total

385
166
551

69.9
30.1
100.0

Coding
Some responses were coded to enable statistical analysis and appropriate
grouping. Question 1, which focused on rank, combined GS09 - GS12 with GS13 GS15, which were option four and five, respectively. On the survey, these were kept
separately to identify different categories of seniority associated with pay. Following data
collection, these two options were combined because there are no civilians in the

Operating Forces. All civilian employees either work at Headquarters, Marine Corps or
within the Supporting Establishment.
Question 3 was coded to quantify responses that were entered in as four-digit
occupational fields or military occupational specialties. Because the infantry occupational
field (03XX) was the primary target population, they were assigned number 1. Other
Combat Arms, which consists of artillery (08XX), combat engineers (13XX), and
tank/amphibious assault vehicle operators (18XX) were assigned number 2. Number 3
was assigned to 02XX (intelligence) personnel. Number 4 was assigned to 04XX
(logistics) personnel. Number 5 was assigned to 06XX (communications) personnel,
while number 6 was assigned to all other occupational fields. All others accounted for
only 5.1% of the sample population.
Question 4 addressed recent deployment experience. This was written as a yes or
no question-type. Those that answered yes were assigned number 1, while those that
answered no were assigned number 2.
Question 5 established groups by organization. Operating Forces, Marine Forces
Reserve, and resident Professional Military Education (PME) students were all assigned
number 1 and grouped into the Operating Forces group. Reserve Marines frequently
deploy along side of the Active Component and the leadership of the PME schools were
asked for feedback from those that had come to the school directly from the Operating
Forces. Participants from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment
were assigned number 2. Using this coding enabled all data to be quantified and provided
an opportunity for those that were not on active duty, or those attending schools to
participate with their peers.

Descriptive Statistics
Following the initial five demographic questions, the remaining 20 questions were
spread across the DOTMLPF construct addressing common issues found in the literature
and relating those issues to current Marine Corps issues surrounding C2. Each of these
questions was written in the form of a statement. The response options were based on a
five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly Disagree to (5) Strongly Agree.
Descriptive statistics for each category within the DOTMLPF construct is provided
below.
Doctrine
Within the Doctrine category, there were two questions. Question 6 stated the
following: Current Marine Corps doctrine provides sufficient guidance to effectively
employ C2 systems. Representing 5.6% of the sample, 31 people strongly disagreed with
this statement; 157 people slightly disagreed (28.5%); 119 people answered neutral
(21.6%); 213 people slightly agreed (38.7%); and 31 people strongly agreed with this
statement (5.6%). The mean response was 3.10, indicating a neutral response to this
question within the sample, which is reflected in Table 4.
Question 7 stated the following: Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2
employment practices witnessed in current operations. Representing 11.8% of the
sample, 65 people strongly disagreed with this statement; 201 people slightly disagreed
(36.5%); 115 people answered neutral (20.9%); 154 people slightly agreed (27.9%); and
16 people strongly agreed with this statement (2.9%). The mean response was 2.74,
indicating a neutral response to this question within the sample, which is reflected in
Table 4.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics within doctrine (n=551)
Question

M

Median

SD

6
7

3.10
2.74

3.00
3.00

1.06
1.08

Organization
Within the Organization category, there were two questions. Question 8 stated the
following: Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2
systems. Representing 18.1% of the sample, 100 people strongly disagreed with this
statement; 197 people slightly disagreed (35.8%); 91 people answered neutral (16.5%);
146 people slightly agreed (26.5%); and 17 people strongly agreed with this statement
(3.1%). The mean response was 2.61, indicating a neutral response to this question within
the sample, which is reflected in Table 5.
Question 9 stated the following: Current tables of organization (T/O) support the
effective employment of C2 systems. Representing 22.5% of the sample, 124 people
strongly disagreed with this statement; 200 people slightly disagreed (36.3%); 84 people
answered neutral (15.2%); 131 people slightly agreed (23.8%); and 12 people strongly
agreed with this statement (2.2%). The mean response was 2.47, indicating that the
sample slightly disagreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 5.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics within organization (n=551)
Question

M

Median

SD

8
9

2.61
2.47

2.00
2.00

1.15
1.14

61
Training
Within the Training category, six questions reflected statistical significance.
Question 10 stated the following: C2 system training is an important component of predeployment training. Four people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing
0.7% of the sample; 24 people slightly disagreed (4.4%); 19 people answered neutral
(3.4%); 111 people slightly agreed (20.1%); and 393 people strongly agreed with this
statement (71.3%). The mean response was 4.57, indicating that the sample strongly
agreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 6.
Question 11 stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately supports
the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. Thirty-four people
strongly disagreed with this statement (6.2%); 149 people slightly disagreed (27.0%); 92
people answered neutral (16.7%); 231 people slightly agreed (41.9%); and 45 people
strongly agreed with this statement (8.2%). The mean response was 3.19, indicating a
neutral response to this question within the sample, which is reflected in Table 6.
Question 12 stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated within
the pre-deployment training program (PTP). Twenty-four people strongly disagreed with
this statement (4.4%); 38 people slightly disagreed (6.9%); 36 people answered neutral
(6.5%); 163 people slightly agreed (29.6%); and 290 people strongly agreed with this
statement (52.6%). The mean response was 4.19, indicating that the sample slightly
agreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 6.
Question 13 stated the following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized
throughout PTP, including individual and collective training and mission rehearsal
exercises. Thirty-one people strongly disagreed with this statement (5.6%); 156 people
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slightly disagreed (28.3%); 132 people answered neutral (24.0%); 191 people slightly
agreed (34.7%); and 41 people strongly agreed with this statement (7.4%). The mean
response was 3.10, indicating a neutral response to this question within the sample, which
is reflected in Table 6.
Question 14 stated the following: Marines are generally knowledgeable of what
C2 system training is available at home-station. Sixty-four people strongly disagreed with
this statement (11.6%); 225 people slightly disagreed (40.8%); 100 people answered
neutral (18.1%); 144 people slightly agreed (26.1%); and 18 people strongly agreed with
this statement (3.3%). The mean response was 2.69, indicating a neutral response to this
question within the sample, which is reflected in Table 6.
Question 15 stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 Training
Continuum. Representing 19.6%) of the sample, 108 people strongly disagreed with this
statement; 247 people slightly disagreed (44.8%); 118 people answered neutral (21.4%);
73 people slightly agreed (13.2%); and five people strongly agreed with this statement
(0.9%). The mean response was 2.31, indicating that the sample slightly disagreed with
this statement, which is reflected in Table 6.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics within training (n=551)
Question

M

Median

SD

10
11
12

4.57
3.19
4.19

5.00
4.00
5.00

0.81
1.11
1.11

13

3.10

3.00

1.07

14
15

2.69
2.31

2.00
2.00

1.08
0.96
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Materiel
Within the Materiel category, there were two survey questions. Question 16 stated
the following: Current C2 systems adequately support current operations. Twenty-seven
people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 4.9% of the sample; 69 people
slightly disagreed (12.5%); 107 people answered neutral (19.4%); 292 people slightly
agreed (53.0%); and 56 people strongly agreed with this statement (10.2%). The mean
response was 3.51, indicating that the sample slightly agreed with this statement, which is
reflected in Table 7.
Question 17 stated the following: There is a widespread understanding of the
capabilities of C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. Ninety people strongly
disagreed with this statement, representing 16.3% of the sample; 247 people slightly
disagreed (44.8%); 108 people answered neutral (19.6%); 96 people slightly agreed
(17.4%); and 10 people strongly agreed with this statement (1.8%). The mean response
was 2.44, indicating that the sample slightly disagreed with this statement, which is
reflected in Table 7.
Table 7
Descriptive statistics within materiel (n=551)
Question

M

Median

SD

16
17

3.51
2.44

4.00
2.00

1.00
1.02

Leadership and Education
Within the Leadership and Education category, there were two questions.
Question 18 stated the following: C2 system training should be incorporated into
professional military education (PME) programs. Twenty-five people strongly disagreed
with this statement, representing 4.5% of the sample; 46 people slightly disagreed
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(8.3%); 51 people answered neutral (9.3%); 227 people slightly agreed (41.2%); and 202
people strongly agreed with this statement (36.7%). The mean response was 3.97,
indicating the sample slightly agreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 8.
Question 19 stated the following: Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to
best employ C2 systems in an operational environment. Thirty-seven people strongly
disagreed with this statement, representing 6.7% of the sample; 167 people slightly
disagreed (30.3%); 141 people answered neutral (25.6%); 183 people slightly agreed
(33.2%); and 23 people strongly agreed with this statement (4.2%). The mean response
was 2.98, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, which is
reflected in Table 8.
Table 8
Descriptive statistics within leadership and education (n=551)

Question

M

Median

SD

18
19

3.97
2.98

4.00
3.00

1.10
1.04

Personnel
Within the Personnel category, there were four questions. Question 20 stated the
following: A primary MOS should be established to provide dedicated C2 system
operators. Sixty-five people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 11.8% of
the sample; 112 people slightly disagreed (20.3%); 100 people answered neutral (18.1%);
154 people slightly agreed (27.9%); and 120 people strongly agreed with this statement
(21.8%). The mean response was 3.28, indicating a neutral response to this statement
within the sample, which is reflected in Table 9.
Question 21 stated the following: C2 system operator structure should be sourced
from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). Seventy-seven people strongly
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disagreed with this statement, representing 14.0% of the sample; 128 people slightly
disagreed (23.2%); 129 people answered neutral (23.4%); 149 people slightly agreed
(27.0%); and 68 people strongly agreed with this statement (12.3%). The mean response
was 3.01, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, which is
reflected in Table 9.
Question 22 stated the following: Currently, COC personnel are adequately
trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. Forty people strongly
disagreed with this statement, representing 7.3% of the sample; 176 people slightly
disagreed (31.9%); 121 people answered neutral (22.0%); 194 people slightly agreed
(35.2%); and 20 people strongly agreed with this statement (3.6%). The mean response
was 2.96, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, which is
reflected in Table 9.
Question 23 stated the following: COC staff members across the warfighting
functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other unit
members. Seventy-seven people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing
14.0% of the sample; 192 people slightly disagreed (34.8%); 131 people answered neutral
(23.8%); 140 people slightly agreed (25.4%); and 11 people strongly agreed with this
statement (2.0%). The mean response was 2.67, indicating a neutral response to this
statement within the sample, which is reflected in Table 9.
Table 9
Descriptive statistics within personnel (n=551)

Question

M

Median

SD

20
21
22
23

3.28
3.01
2.96
2.67

3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00

1.32
1.25
1.05
1.06
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Facilities
Within the Facilities category, there were two questions. Question 24 stated the
following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately supports
effective C2. Sixteen people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 2.9% of
the sample; 76 people slightly disagreed (13.8%); 118 people answered neutral (21.4%);
284 people slightly agreed (51.5%); and 57 people strongly agreed with this statement
(10.3%). The mean response was 3.53, indicating that the sample slightly agreed with this
statement, which is reflected in Table 10.
Question 25 stated the following: Units are adequately trained to proficiently
install, operate, and maintain the COC prior to deployment. Seventy-seven people
strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 14.0% of the sample; 173 people
slightly disagreed (31.4%); 124 people answered neutral (22.5%); 162 people slightly
agreed (29.4%); and 15 people strongly agreed with this statement (2.7%). The mean
response was 2.75, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample,
which is reflected in Table 10.
Table 10
Descriptive statistics within facilities (n=551)

Question

M

Median

SD

24
25

3.53
2.75

4.00
3.00

0.95
1.10

Reliability
Following data collection, Cronbach's alpha was once again used to determine
internal consistency of the survey questions across the DOTMLPF construct. This
resulted in a score of .818, which is considered good when addressing internal
consistency (Morgan et al., 2004).

Statistically Significant Findings
This study was guided by five research hypotheses, which were written in the
form of null hypotheses. This section will identify the statistically significant findings of
each of the five hypotheses.
Results Related to Organization (Hoi)
Beginning with Hoi, the null hypothesis was written as follows: There is no
difference in the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems
between the Operating Forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment
across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. An independent samples Mest was used as
the statistical method to address Hoi. The Operating Forces (OPFOR) group consisted of
385 respondents, while Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment
(HQMC/SE) consisted of 166 respondents. Of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF
construct, two questions resulted in statistical significance between the OPFOR and
HQMC/SE at the 95% confidence interval.
Question 13, related to training, stated the following: C2 system training is
adequately emphasized throughout the pre-deployment training program (PTP), including
individual and collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. The mean response of
the OPFOR (M= 3.18) was greater than that of HQMC/SE (M= 2.92), tm9) = 2.67,
(p =.008).
Question 19, related to leadership and education, stated the following: Unit
leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational
environment. The mean response of the OPFOR (M= 3.04) was greater than that of
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HQMC/SE (M= 2.83), /(549)= 2.29, (p =.023). The statistically significant findings for
Hoi are reflected in Table 11.
Table 11
HQI: T-test results indicating statistical significance (n= 385 OPFOR and 166 HQMC/SE)
Organization

M

SD

3.18
2.92

1.07
1.05

3.04
2J53

1.04
L02

/

df

p

2.67

549

.008*

2.29

549

.023*

Q13
OPFOR
HQMC/SE
Q19
OPFOR
HQMC/SE

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Results Related to Occupational Field (H02)
Hypothesiso2 aimed to compare responses among several different occupational
fields across the DOTMLPF construct. H02 stated the following: There is no relationship
between occupational field and the perception of the effective employment of Marine
Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. One-way ANOVA was used as the
statistical method to address this hypothesis. The infantry occupational field (03XX)
consisted of 404 respondents, which was 73.3% of the sample population. All other
occupational fields accounted for less than 10% each. Because the infantry community
was the primary target audience of this study, these numbers were to be expected. Seven
of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct resulted in statistical significance at
the 95% confidence interval.
Question 8, related to organization, stated the following: Current tables of
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The infantry
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of
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2.50. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a
mean response of 2.82. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51
participants and had a mean response of 2.82. The logistics occupational field (04XX)
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.09. The communications
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.17. All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 2.75. The
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 2.61. Table 12
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 8, F(5, 545)
= 3.33, p = .006.
Table 12
H02: Findings for Question 8 (organization) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
03XX (Infantry)
Other Combat Arms
02XX (Intelligence)
04XX (Logistics)
06XX (Communications)
Other
Total

n
404
22
51
23
23
28
551

SS
One-Way ANOVA
df
Between Groups
5
21.48
545
704.06
Within Groups
725.54
550
Total
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

M
2.50
2.82
2.82
3.09
3.17
2.75
2.61
MS
4.30
1.29

SD
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.12
1.11
1.04
1.15
F
3.32

P
.006*

Question 9, also related to organization, reflected statistical significance among
various occupational fields. Question 9 stated the following: Current tables of
organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The infantry
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of
2.39. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a
mean response of 2.45. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51
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participants and had a mean response of 2.75. The logistics occupational field (04XX)
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.22. The communications
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.30. All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 2.61. The
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 2.47. Table 13
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 9, F(5, 545)
= 3.18,/? = .008.
Table 13
HQ2- Findings for Question 9 (organization) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
03XX (Infantry)
Other Combat Arms
02XX (Intelligence)
04XX (Logistics)
06XX (Communications)
Other
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
404
22
51
23
23
28
551

df
5
545
550

M
2.39
2.45
2.75
3.22
2.30
2.61
2.47
SS
20.38
698.81
719.19

MS
4.08
1.28

SD
1.16
1.34
0.96
1.04
1.06
1.03
1.14
F
3.18

P
.008*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Within the Training category of questions, Question 11 reflected statistical
significance. This question stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately
supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. The infantry
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of
3.21. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a
mean response of 3.00. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51
participants and had a mean response of 3.00. The logistics occupational field (04XX)
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.78. The communications
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occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.70. All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 3.29. The
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 3.19. Table 14
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 11, F(5, 545)
= 2.11,p = .018.
Table 14
H02: Findings for Question 11 (training) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
(Infantry)
Combat Arms
(Intelligence)
(Logistics)
(Communications)

One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
404
22
51
23
23
28
551

df

SS

5
545
550

16.76
659.61
676.37

M

SD

3.21
3.00
3.00
3.78
2.70
3.29
3.19
MS

1.12
1.23
1.00
0.90
0.82
1.18
1.11

3.35
1.21

F
2.77

P
.018*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Also within the Training category of questions, Question 12 reflected statistical
significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated
within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). The infantry occupational field
(03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 4.14. Other Combat
Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a mean response of
4.64. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a
mean response of 4.02. The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23
participants and had a mean response of 4.65. The communications occupational field
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 4.30. All other occupational
fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 4.50. The total participants
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consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 4.19. Table 15 reflects the
findings among different occupational fields related to Question 12, F(5, 545) = 2.47,
p = .031.
Table 15
HQ2- Findings for Question 12 (training) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
03XX (Infantry)
Other Combat Arms
02XX (Intelligence)
04XX (Logistics)
06XX (Communications)
Other
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

SD

404
22
51
23
23
28
551

4.14
4.64
4.02
4.65
4.30
4.50
4.19
MS

1.14
0.58
1.17
0.49
1.18
0.96
1.11

df

SS
14.94
658.67

5
545
550
673.61
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

2.99
1.21

F
2.47

P
.031*

Once again, within the Training category of questions, Question 13 reflected
statistical significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training is
adequately emphasized throughout PTP, including individual and collective training and
mission rehearsal exercises. The infantry occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404
participants and had a mean response of 3.10. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX)
consisted of 22 participants and had a mean response of 2.95. The intelligence
occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a mean response of 3.25.
The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a mean
response of 3.35. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and
had a mean response of 2.30. All other occupational fields consisted of 28 participants
and had a mean response of 3.32. The total participants consisted of 551 people and
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reflected a mean response of 3.10. Table 16 reflects the findings among different
occupational fields related to Question 13, F(5, 545) = 3.40, p = .005.
Table 16
H02: Findings for Question 13 (training) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
n
M

SD

03XX (Infantry)
Other Combat Arms
02XX (Intelligence)
04XX (Logistics)
06XX (Communications)
Other
Total

1.08
1.13
1.00
0.93
0.97
0.94
1.07

One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

404
22
51
23
23
28
551

df
5
545
550

SS
19.04
610.47
629.51

3.10
2.95
3.25
3.35
2.30
3.32
3.10
MS
3.81
1.12

F
3.40

P
.005*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Within the Materiel category of questions, Question 17 reflected statistical
significance. This question stated the following: There is a widespread understanding of
the capabilities of C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. The infantry
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of
2.43. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a
mean response of 2.18. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51
participants and had a mean response of 2.35. The logistics occupational field (04XX)
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.91. The communications
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.04. All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 2.79. The
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 2.44. Table
17 reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 17,
F(5, 545) = 2.76,/? = .018.
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Table 17
H02: Findings for Question 17 (materiel) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
n
M
03XX (Infantry)
404
2.43
Other Combat Arms
22
2.18
02XX (Intelligence)
2.35
51
2.91
04XX (Logistics)
23
2.04
06XX (Communications)
23
2.79
Other
28
Total
551
2.44
SS
MS
F
One-Way ANOVA
df
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

5
545
550

13.99
553.48
567.46

2.80
1.02

2.75

SD
1.01
1.05
0.93
1.08
1.02
1.03
1.02
P
.018*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.
Lastly, within the Personnel category of questions, Question 21 reflected
statistical significance. This question stated the following: C2 system operator structure
should be sourced from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). The infantry
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of
3.06. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a
mean response of 2.73. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51
participants and had a mean response of 2.49. The logistics occupational field (04XX)
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.09. The communications
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.30. All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 3.07. The
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 3.01. Table 18
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 21, F(5, 545)
= 2.44,/? = .034.
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Table 18
H02: Findings for Question 21 (personnel) among different occupational fields
Descriptive Statistics
n
M
03XX (Infantry)
404
3.06
Other Combat Arms
22
2.73
02XX (Intelligence)
51
2.49
04XX (Logistics)
23
3.09
06XX (Communications)
23
3.30
Other
28
3.07
Total
551
3.01
MS
F
One-Way ANOVA
SS
df
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

5
545
550

18.75
838.24
856.98

3.75
1.54

SD
1.27
0.98
1.03
1.35
1.36
1.09
1.25

2.44

P
.034*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.
Results Related to Experience (H03)
Hypothesiso3 aimed to compare responses across the DOTMLPF construct based
on experience, or time-in-service. H03 stated the following: There is no relationship
between experience and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2
systems across the DOTMLPF construct. One-way ANOVA was used as the statistical
method used to address this hypothesis. There were 245 respondents having between 12
and 20 years of service, which amounted to 44.5% of the participants. All other
experience levels varied widely. Six of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct
resulted in statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.
The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different
experience levels was Question 10, related to training. This question stated the following:
C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training. Participants
having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people and had a mean
response of 4.83. Participants having greater than four years and up to eight years of
experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 4.23. Participants having
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greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63
people and had a mean response of 4.56. Participants having greater than 12 years of
experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 people and had a mean
response of 4.67. Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125
people and had a mean response of 4.68. The total number of participants consisted of
551 people and had a mean response of 4.57. Table 19 reflects the findings among
different levels of experience related to Question 10, F(4, 546) = 6.65, p < .001.
Table 19
H03: Findings for Question 10 (training) among different levels of experience
Descriptive Statistics
0 - 4 Years
> 4 - 8 Years
>8-12 Years
>12-20 Years
>20 Years
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
6
112
63
245
125
551

df
4
546
550

M
4.83
4.23
4.56
4.67
4.68
4.57
SS
16.95
348.11
365.06

MS
4.24
0.64

SD
0.41
1.00
0.84
0.73
0.70
0.81
F
6.65

P
.000*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Also within the training category, Question 11 reflected statistical significance
based on different levels of experience. Question 11 stated the following: Current C2
system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an
operational context. Participants having between zero and four years of experience
consisted of six people and had a mean response of 2.33. Participants having greater than
four years and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean
response of 3.03. Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12
years of experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 2.81. Participants
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having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of
245 people and had a mean response of 3.29. Participants with greater than 20 years of
experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 3.36. The total number of
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 3.19. Table 20 reflects
the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 11, F(4, 546) =
4.75,p = .001.
Table 20
H03: Findings for Question 11 (training) among different levels of experience
Descriptive Statistics
0 - 4 Years
> 4 - 8 Years
> 8 - 1 2 Years
> 1 2 - 2 0 Years
>20 Years
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

SD

6
112
63
245
125
551

2.33
3.03
2.81
3.29
3.36
3.19
MS

1.03
1.08
1.06
1.12
1.07
1.11

df
4
546
550

SS

22.76
653.61
676.37
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

5.69
1.20

F
4.75

P
.001*

Question 12, also within the training category, reflected statistical significance
based on different levels of experience. This question stated the following: C2 system
training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training program (PTP).
Participants having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people and
had a mean response of 4.33. Participants having greater than four years and up to eight
years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 3.88.
Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of
experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 4.27. Participants having
greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245
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people and had a mean response of 4.25. Participants with greater than 20 years of
experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 4.31. The total number of
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 4.19. Table 21 reflects
the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 12, F(A, 546) =
2.84, p = . 024.
Table 21
H03: Findings for Question 12 (training) among different levels of experience
Descriptive Statistics
0 - 4 Years
> 4 - 8 Years
>8-12 Years
>12-20 Years
>20 Years
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
6
112
63
245
125
551

df
4
546
550

M
4.33
3.88
4.27
4.25
4.31
4.19
SS
13.73
659.88
673.61

MS
3.43
1.21

SD
0.82
1.24
1.05
1.09
1.03
1.11
F
2.84

P
.024*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Within the personnel category, Question 22 reflected statistical significance based
on different levels of experience. This question stated the following: Currently, COC
personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment.
Participants having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people and
had a mean response of 3.67. Participants having greater than four years and up to eight
years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 3.07.
Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of
experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 3.19. Participants having
greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245
people and had a mean response of 2.85. Participants with greater than 20 years of
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experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 2.93. The total number of
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.96. Table 22 reflects
the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 22, F(4, 546) =
2.48, p = . 043.
Table 22
H03: Findings for Question 22 (personnel) among different levels of experience
Descriptive Statistics
0 - 4 Years
> 4 - 8 Years
>8-12 Years
>12-20 Years
>20 Years
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
6
112
63
245
125
551

M
3.67
3.07
3.19
2.85
2.93
2.96

df

SS

4
546
550

10.88
598.24
609.12

MS
2.72
1.10

SD
1.03
1.11
1.05
1.04
0.99
1.05
F
2.48

P
.043*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Also within the personnel category, Question 23 reflected statistical significance
based on different levels of experience. This question stated the following: COC staff
members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to
conduct PTP with other unit members. Participants having between zero and four years of
experience consisted of six people and had a mean response of 3.00. Participants having
greater than four years and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and
had a mean response of 2.80. Participants having greater than eight years of experience
and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 2.90.
Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience
consisted of 245 people and had a mean response of 2.64. Participants with greater than
20 years of experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 2.46. The
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total number of participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.67.
Table 23 reflects the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 23,
F(4, 546) = 2.69, ^ = .030.
Table 23
H03: Findings for Question 23 (personnel) among different levels of experience
Descriptive Statistics
0 - 4 Years
> 4 - 8 Years
>8-12 Years
>12-20 Years
>20 Years
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
6
112
63
245
125
551

df
4
546
550

M
3.00
2.80
2.90
2.64
2.46
2.67
SS
12.05
610.51
622.56

SD
1.55
1.09
0.93
1.08
1.01
1.06

MS

F

3.01
1.12

2.69

P
.030*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Question 24, within the facilities category, was the last question that reflected
statistical significance based on different levels of experience. This question stated the
following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately supports
effective C2. Participants having between zero and four years of experience consisted of
six people and had a mean response of 4.17. Participants having greater than four years
and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of
3.71. Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of
experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 3.59. Participants having
greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245
people and had a mean response of 3.48. Participants with greater than 20 years of
experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 3.39. The total number of
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 3.53. Table 24 reflects
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the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 24, F(4, 546)
2.64, p = .033.
Table 24
H03: Findings for Question 24 (personnel) among different levels of experience
Descriptive Statistics
0 - 4 Years
>4 - 8 Years
> 8 - 1 2 Years
> 1 2 - 2 0 Years
>20 Years
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

SD

6
112
63
245
125
551

4.17
3.71
3.59
3.48
3.39
3.53
MS

0.75
0.86
0.82
1.01
0.95
0.95

df

SS

4
546
550

9.49
489.88
499.37

2.37
0.90

F
2.64

P
.033*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Results Related to Rank (H04)
Hypothesises aimed to compare responses across the DOTMLPF construct based
on the participant's rank. H04 stated the following: There is no relationship between rank
and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the
DOTMLPF construct. One-way ANOVA was used as the statistical method used to
address this hypothesis. The uniformed Marines that responded to this survey were fairly
well-balanced across the three groups associated with rank. SNCOs provided 149
respondents. Company Grade Officers provided 186 responses, while Field Grade
Officers provided 189 responses. Government civilian participants reflected a relatively
small number of 27 total respondents. This was to be expected based on the small number
of civilian employees related to uniformed service members. Across the DOTMLPF
construct, 11 of the 20 questions resulted in statistical significance at the 95% confidence
interval.
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The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different
experience levels was Question 7, related to doctrine. This question stated the following:
Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 employment practices witnessed in current
operations. Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) consisted of 149 people and had
a group mean of 3.01. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group
mean of 2.63. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of
2.62. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean
of 2.74. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.74.
Table 25 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 7, F(3, 547) =
4.67, p = . 003.
Table 25
H04: Findings for Question 7 (doctrine) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12-GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
149
186
189
27
551

df
3
547
550

M
3.01
2.63
2.62
2.74
2.74
SS
15.97
624.87
640.84

MS
5.32
1.14

SD
1.12
1.02
1.05
1.23
1.08
F
4.66

P
.003*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Within the organization category, Question 8 reflected statistical significance
among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables of
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. SNCOs consisted of
149 people and had a group mean of 2.79. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186
people and had a group mean of 2.66. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and
had a group mean of 2.38. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people

83

and had a group mean of 2.89. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean
response of 2.61. Table 26 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question
8,F(3,547) = 4.49,p = .004.
Table 26
H04: Findings for Question 8 (organization) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

149
186
189
27
551

2.79
2.66
2.38
2.89
2.61

df
3
547
550

SS
17.44
708.10
725.54

SD
1.12
1.02
1.05
1.23
1.08

MS

F

5.81
1.29

4.49

P
.004*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Also within the organization category, Question 9 reflected statistical significance
among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables of
organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. SNCOs consisted of
149 people and had a group mean of 2.72. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186
people and had a group mean of 2.52. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and
had a group mean of 2.19. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people
and had a group mean of 2.70. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean
response of 2.47. Table 27 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question
9,F(3, 547) = 7.08,p<.001.
Table 27
H04: Findings for Question 9 (organization) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers

n

M

149
186
189

2.72
2.52
2.19

SD
____
1.06
1.14
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Table 27 (Continued)
H04: Findings for Question 9 (organization) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Government Civilians (GS12 --GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

SD

27
551

2.70
2.47

1.27
1.14

df

SS

MS

F

3
547
550

26.88
692.32
719.19

8.96
1.27

7.08

P
.000*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Within the training category, four of six questions reflected statistical significance
among the different ranks. Question 10 was the first item. This question stated the
following: C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training.
SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 4.57. Company Grade Officers
consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 4.39. Field Grade Officers consisted of
189 people and had a group mean of 4.74. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 4.63. Total respondents consisted of 551
people and had a mean response of 4.57. Table 28 reflects the findings among different
ranks related to Question 10, F(3, 547) = 6.1 \,p < .001.
Table 28
H04: Findings for Question 10 (training) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

149
186
189
27
551

4.57
4.39
4.74
4.63
4.57

df
3
547
550

SS
11.83
353.23
365.06

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

MS
3.94
0.65

SD
__
0.95
0.69
0.69
0.81
F
6.11

P
.000*
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Question 11 was the next item within the training category reflecting statistical
significance. This question stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately
supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. SNCOs
consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 3.50. Company Grade Officers
consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 3.03. Field Grade Officers consisted of
189 people and had a group mean of 3.12. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 3.11. Total respondents consisted of 551
people and had a mean response of 3.19. Table 29 reflects the findings among different
ranks related to Question 11, F(3, 547) = 5.60,p = .001.
Table 29
H04: Findings for Question 11 (training) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12-GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
149
186
189
27
551

df
3
547
550

M
3.50
3.03
3.12
3.11
3.19
SS
20.15
656.22
676.37

MS
6.72
1.20

SD
1.02
1.14
1.13
0.89
1.11
F
5.60

P
.001*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Question 12 was the next item within the training category reflecting statistical
significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated
within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). SNCOs consisted of 149 people and
had a group mean of 4.43. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a
group mean of 4.00. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean
of 4.15. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group
mean of 4.48. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of
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4.19. Table 30 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 12, F(3,
547) = 4.96,/? = . 002.
Table 30
H04: Findings for Question 12 (training) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12 --GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n

M

SD

149
186
189
27
551

4.43
4.00
4.15
4.48
4.19
MS

0.86
1.22
1.15
0.89
1.11

df

SS

3
547
550

17.81
655.80
673.61

5.94
1.20

F

P
.002*

4.95

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Question 15 was the last item within the training category reflecting statistical
significance. This question stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2
Training Continuum. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 2.48.
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 2.17. Field
Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 2.30. Government
Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 2.41. Total
respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.31. Table 31 reflects
the findings among different ranks related to Question 15, F(3, 547) = 3.02, p- .029.
Table 31
H04: Findings for Question 15 (training) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
Total

n

M

SD

149
186
189
27
551

2.48
2.17
2.30
2.41
2.31

1.02
0.90
0.96
0.97
0.96
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Table 31 (Continued)
H04: Findings for Question 15 (training) among different ranks
SS
MS
One-Way ANOVA
df
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

3
547
550

8.30
501.63
509.93

2.77
0.92

F
3.02

P
.029*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Within the personnel category, there were three questions indicating statistical
significance. Question 20 was the first item within the personnel category reflecting
statistical significance. This question stated the following: A primary MOS should be
established to provide dedicated C2 system operators. SNCOs consisted of 149 people
and had a group mean of 3.54. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had
a group mean of 3.01. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group
mean of 3.30. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a
group mean of 3.44. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response
of 3.28. Table 32 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 20, F(3,
547) -3.02, p -.029.
Table 32
H04: Findings for Question 20 (personnel) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
149
186
189
27
551

df
3
547
550

M
3.54
3.01
3.30
3.44
3.28
SS
24.65
939.42
964.07

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

MS
8.22
1.72

SD
__
1.33
1.32
1.34
1.32
F
4.78

P
.003*
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The next item reflecting statistical significance in the personnel category was
Question 21. This question stated the following: C2 system operator structure should be
sourced from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). SNCOs consisted of 149
people and had a group mean of 3.22. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people
and had a group mean of 3.05. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a
group mean of 2.76. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and
had a group mean of 3.26. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean
response of 3.01. Table 33 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question
21,F(3, 547) = 4.52,/? = .004.
Table 33
H04: Findings for Question 21 (personnel) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12-GS15)
Total
One-Way ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

n
149
186
189
27
551

M
3.22
3.05
2.76
3.26
3.01

df

SS

3
547
550

20.74
836.25
856.98

MS
6.91
1.53

SD
1.33
1.18
1.20
1.29
1.25
F
4.52

P
.004*

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

The last item reflecting statistical significance in the personnel category was
Question 23. This question stated the following: COC staff members across the
warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other
unit members. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 2.67. Company
Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 2.84. Field Grade
Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 2.55. Government Civilians
(GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 2.22. Total respondents
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consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.67. Table 34 reflects the findings
among different ranks related to Question 23, F(3, 547) = 4.12, p = .007.
Table 34
H04: Findings for Question 23 (personnel) among different ranks
n
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
149
186
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
189
27
Government Civilians (GS12 --GS15)
551
Total
SS
One-Way ANOVA
df
Between Groups
3
13.75
Within Groups
547
608.80
550
622.56
Total
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

M

SD

2.67
2.84

1.07
1.05
1.06
0.93
1.06

2.55
2.22
2.67
MS
4.58
1.11

F

P
.007*

4.12

One item in the facilities category reflected statistical significance. Question 24
stated the following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately
supports effective C2. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 3.44.
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 3.70. Field
Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 3.40. Government
Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 3.70. Total
respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 3.53. Table 35 reflects
the findings among different ranks related to Question 24, F(3, 547) = 4.15,/? = .006.
Table 35
HQ4: Findings for Question 24 (facilities) among different ranks
Descriptive Statistics
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
Company Grade Officers
Field Grade Officers
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15)
Total

n

149
186
189
27
551

M
3.44
3.70
3.40
3.70
3.53

SD
0.97
0.87
1.01
0.78
0.95
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Table 35 (Continued)
H04: Findings for Question 24 (facilities) among different ranks
SS
MS
One-Way ANOVA
df
Between Groups
3
11.12
547
488.25
Within Groups
550
499.37
Total
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

3.71
0.89

F
4.15

P
.006*

Results Related to Recent Deployment Experience (H05)
Hypothesises aimed to compare responses across the DOTMLPF construct
dependent on whether or not the participant had recently deployed. H05 stated the
following: There is no relationship between recent deployment experience and the
perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the
DOTMLPF construct. An independent samples Mest was used as the statistical method
used to address this hypothesis. There were 435 of 551 respondents that had deployed
within the three years prior to participating in this study. Participants that had not recently
deployed consisted of 116 people. Only one of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF
construct resulted in statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. Question 19,
within the leadership and education category, stated the following: Unit leaders are
knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational context. The
mean response of those that have recently deployed (M= 3.03) was greater than those
that had not (M= 2.80), ^549) = 2.07, (p =.039). Findings for Question 19 are reflected in
Table 36.
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Table 36
H05: T-test results based on recent deployment experience (n= 435 Deployed and 116 Not
Deployed)

Question 19
Deployed
Not Deployed

M
3.03
2.80

SD

t

df

P

2.07

549

.039*

1.05
0.95

Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

Summary
There were several statistically significant findings associated with this study.
Hoi, which addressed current organization, reflected two of 20 questions having statistical
significance among the population, which included Question 13 (Training) and Question
19 (Leadership and Education). H02, related to occupational field, indicated seven
questions were statistically significant, which were Questions 8 and 9 (Organization),
Questions 11, 12, and 13 (Training), Question 17 (Materiel), and Question 21
(Personnel). H03, addressing different levels of experience, reflected six statistically
significant findings, which were Questions 10, 11, and 12 (Training), Questions 22 and
23 (Personnel), and Question 24 (Facilities). H04 identified statistical significance among
11 of 20 questions among the different ranks within the population, which were Question
7 (Doctrine), Questions 8 and 9 (Organization), Questions 10, 11,12, and 15 (Training),
Questions 20, 21, and 23 (Personnel), and Question 24 (Facilities). Lastly, H05, which
addressed recent deployment experience, only yielded one question of statistical
significance, which was Question 19 (Leadership and Education). All statistics were
conducted at the 95% confidence interval.
Chapter V will provide a summary of the study and its findings. Conclusions will
be provided based on statistically significant findings, which will be followed by
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recommendations for improvement. In conclusion, Chapter V will provide
recommendations for further research as a result of this study.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Within this study, survey research was conducted to collect quantitative data
addressing the perspectives of command and control (C2) system users and those
responsible for implementing and training C2 systems within the U.S. Marine Corps.
Participants were asked 20 questions spanning across the Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF)
construct to determine if the population's views on current Marine Corps C2 identify any
findings of statistical significance. In this chapter, a summary will be provided to develop
an understanding of the study. Following the summary, conclusions will be provided
based on the statistically significant findings across the research hypotheses. Based on the
findings, recommendations for improvement and further research will be identified.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective
employment of C2 systems to enhance warfighter readiness. To gain an objective
understanding of current perspectives on Marine Corps C2, five research hypotheses
guided this study. Hoi stated the following: There is no difference in the perception of the
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems between the Operating Forces and
Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment across the DOTMLPF construct.
This hypothesis aimed to determine if the two groups shared a common perspective on
current C2 topics and issues. H02 stated the following: There is no relationship between
occupational field and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2
systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Because various occupational fields work

within the target population, it was important to seek input from occupational fields other
than that of the infantry. H03 stated the following: There is no relationship between
experience and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems
across the DOTMLPF construct. This hypothesis aimed to identify if there were different
perspectives across the population based on the individual's experience. H04 stated the
following: There is no relationship between rank and the perception of the effective
employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Typically,
rank is associated with experience, but it was important to focus on rank in addition to
experience because the Marine Corps has a relatively large number of personnel that are
prior-enlisted before pursuing selection as a Warrant Officer or a Commissioned Officer.
H05 stated the following: There is no relationship between recent deployment experience
and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the
DOTMLPF construct. This was included to determine if those that have recently
deployed shared the same perspective as those that have not recently deployed based on
job assignments, both past and present.
There are several organizations involved in shaping C2 requirements including
capability developers, those who manage acquisition programs, C2 system trainers, and
users employing C2 systems during combat operations. The significance of this study is
that decisions have an impact on resources. Time, money, and personnel must be
considered as the Marine Corps moves forward in what appears to be a fiscally
constrained environment. This study provides objective research to validate subjective
feedback within recent after-action reports.
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There were limitations related to this study, which included the following:
1. This study focused specifically on C2 systems, which is one of many forms of IT
used within the Armed Forces consisting of both hardware and software.
2. Research was conducted focusing only on C2 system users and those that
develop, train, and equip the Operating Forces within the U.S. Marine Corps.
3. This study was focused on the effective employment of C2 systems used within
the Combat Operations Center (COC) by the infantry community.
These limitations provided scope to the study and narrowed the research to a specific
focus area. The population of the study included the following:
1. Active and Reserve Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) and Officers up
to and including Colonels within the infantry occupational field;
2. SNCOs and Officers of any occupational field that are now serving in an infantry
unit or have recently served in an infantry unit;
3. SNCOs and Officers within the Division/Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Marine
Expeditionary Force staff familiar with C2 systems used in the infantry
community;
4. SNCOs, Officers, and Civilian Marines (GS12 - GS15) involved in the capability
development, acquisition, and training of C2 systems from Headquarters, Marine
Corps and the Supporting Establishment.
Data were collected through a web-based survey that was sent via email to
organizational leaders meeting the target population description and/or unit commanders
of the Marines that met the population description. By including all of these individuals
in the study, objective research was conducted by investigating all of those involved in

shaping and using C2 systems in the Marine Corps. The total response rate within the
population was approximately 11 %. Minimum sample sizes from the Operating Forces
group and Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment group were
exceeded, which provide statistical significance to these findings.
Conclusions
There were several statistically significant findings across the DOTMLPF
construct addressing the five research hypotheses. While each question highlighted a
current issue associated with Marine Corps C2, the practical significance of the findings
is also addressed for each research hypothesis.
Hypothesis^ focused on organization and stated the following: There is no
difference in the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems
between the Operating Forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment
across the DOTMLPF construct. Using a /-test, two questions reflected statistical
significant differences among groups.
Question 13 stated the following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized
throughout the pre-deployment training program (PTP), including individual and
collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. The mean response of the OPFOR
(M= 3.18) was greater than that of HQMC/SE (M= 2.92), t(5A9) = 2.67, (p =.008).
Related to training, the null hypothesis would be rejected. This indicates that the OPFOR
felt that C2 system training is adequately emphasized during PTP to a greater degree than
the HQMC/SE group, although neither group agreed with this statement. These results
identify an opportunity for improvement regarding the emphasis placed on C2 system
training throughout PTP.

Question 19, related to leadership and education, stated the following: Unit
leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational
environment. The mean response of the OPFOR (M= 3.04) was greater than that of
HQMC/SE (M= 2.83), f(549) = 2.29, (p -.023). Related to leadership and education, the
null hypothesis would be rejected. This indicates that the OPFOR felt unit leaders are
more knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems to a greater degree than
HQMC/SE, although neither group collectively agreed with this statement. These results
identify an opportunity for improvement regarding unit leaders' knowledge regarding C2
system capabilities.
Between the two groups (OPFOR and HQMC/SE), Hoi was rejected regarding
Training and Leadership and Education. Although only two questions across the
DOTMLPF construct reflected a statistically significant difference among group means,
the Marine Corps must consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective
employment of C2 systems. Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting
Establishment must maintain a constant awareness of the needs of the Operating Forces.
At the same time, both groups must maintain realistic expectations of one another to
enhance warfighter readiness. This feedback cycle will ensure a shared perception of the
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems between the Operating Forces and
Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment. See Table 37, which identifies
group means for statistically significant findings related to Hoi.
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Table 37
Hoi: Mean responses by organization for questions resulting in statistical significance
n

Q13

Q19

OPFOR

385

3.18

3.04

HQMC/SE

166

2.92

2.83

Organization

Note. Total Sample = 551. OPFOR = Operating Forces; HQMC/SE = Headquarters, Marine Corps/
Supporting Establishment. Q13 = Training; Q19 = Leadership and Education.

Hypothesiso2 focused on occupational field and stated the following: There is no
relationship between occupational field and the perception of the effective employment
of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Using one-way ANOVA,
seven questions identified statistical significance among different occupational fields.
Question 8, related to organization, stated the following: Current tables of
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample provided a
neutral response to this statement (M= 2.61). Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the
null hypothesis should be rejected related to organization, F(5, 545) = 3.33,p = .006.
This means that the different occupational fields working within infantry units have
different views regarding the ability of the equipment to enable effective C2. The infantry
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a neutral mean
response of 2.50. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants
and had a neutral mean response of 2.82. The intelligence occupational field (02XX)
consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.82. The logistics
occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean response
of 3.09. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a
neutral mean response of 3.17. All other occupational fields consisted of 28 participants
and had a neutral mean response of 2.75. Although all occupational fields had a neutral

mean response to this question, no occupational field agreed with this statement. This
suggests a need to evaluate current T/E related to C2 capabilities. Mean responses among
different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38.
Question 9, also related to organization, stated the following: Current tables of
organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample slightly
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.47), indicating a need to evaluate T/O structure
within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be
rejected related to organization, F(5, 545) = 3.18,/? = .008. This means that the different
occupational fields working within infantry units have different views regarding the
organizational structure enabling effective C2. The infantry occupational field (03XX)
accounted for 404 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (M- 2.39).
Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and slightly
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.45). The intelligence occupational field (02XX)
consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral response to this statement (M- 2.75). The
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral
response to this statement (M= 3.22). The communications occupational field consisted
of 23 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.30). All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a neutral response to this
statement (M= 2.61). All occupational fields either slightly disagreed with this statement
or had a neutral mean response to this question, which indicates that no occupational field
agreed with this statement. This suggests a need to evaluate organizational structure
related to effective C2. Mean responses among different occupational fields are reflected
in Table 38.

Within the Training category of questions, Question 11 stated the following:
Current C2 system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 systems
in an operational context. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M=
3.19), indicating a need to evaluate the effectiveness of C2 system training. Results of
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(5,
545) = 2.77,p = .018. This means that the different occupational fields working within
infantry units have different views regarding the ability of training to enable effective C2.
The infantry occupational field (03 XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a neutral
mean response of 3.21. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22
participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.00. The intelligence occupational field
(02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.00. The
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and slightly agreed with
this statement (M= 3.78). The communications occupational field consisted of 23
participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.70. All other occupational fields
consisted of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.29. Other than the
logistics occupational field, all other occupational fields had a neutral mean response to
this statement, which raises question to why the logistics occupational field has a
different perception regarding the ability of training to enable effective C2. Mean
responses among different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38.
Also within the Training category of questions, Question 12 stated the following:
C2 system training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training program
(PTP). The sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19), indicating the
perceived importance of C2 system training within infantry units. Results of one-way

ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(5, 545) =
2.47, p = .031. This means that the different occupational fields working within infantry
units have different views regarding whether or not C2 system training should be
mandatory. The infantry occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.14). Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX,
18XX) consisted of 22 participants and strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.64).
The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and slightly
agreed with this statement (M= 4.02). The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted
of 23 participants and strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.65). The
communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and slightly agreed with
this statement (M= 4.30). All other occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and
strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.50). All occupational fields agreed with this
statement to some extent, which raises question as to whether or not Marines are able to
attend C2 system training prior to deployment. Mean responses among different
occupational fields are reflected in Table 38.
Once again, within the Training category of questions, Question 13 stated the
following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized throughout PTP, including
individual and collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. The sample provided a
neutral response to this statement (M= 3.10), indicating a need to assess the progression
of C2 system training throughout various training venues. Results of one-way ANOVA
indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(5, 545) = 3.40,
p = .005. This means that the different occupational fields working within infantry units
have different views regarding the emphasis placed on C2 system training within PTP.

The infantry occupational field (03 XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a neutral
mean response of 3.10. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22
participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.95. The intelligence occupational field
(02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.25. The
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean
response of 3.35. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.30). All other occupational fields consisted
of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.32. The communications
occupational field slightly disagreed with this statement, while all others had a neutral
response. This means that none of the occupational fields represented feel that C2 system
training is adequately emphasized during pre-deployment training. Mean responses
among different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38.
Within the Materiel category of questions, Question 17 stated the following:
There is a widespread understanding of the capabilities of C2 systems used across the
warfighting functions. The sample slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.44),
indicating a need to evaluate C2 system use across the warfighting functions within
infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be
rejected related to materiel, F(5, 545) = 2.76, p = .018. This means that the different
occupational fields working within infantry units have different views regarding the
understanding of C2 system capabilities. The infantry occupational field (03XX)
accounted for 404 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (A/= 2.43).
Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and slightly
disagreed with this statement (M- 2.18). The intelligence occupational field (02XX)
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consisted of 51 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.35). The
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean
response of 2.91. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and
slightly disagreed with this statement (A/= 2.04). All other occupational fields consisted
of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.79. All occupational fields either
slightly disagreed or had a neutral response to this statement, but no single occupational
field agreed with this statement. This indicates a perceived lack of understanding of the
capabilities of C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. Mean responses among
different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38.
Lastly, within the Personnel category of questions, Question 21 stated the
following: C2 system operator structure should be sourced from within the infantry
occupational field (OCCFLD). The sample provided a neutral response to this statement
(M= 3.01), indicating a need to determine if a C2 system operator OCCFLD is required
and, if determined to be a requirement, where manpower would be sourced. Results of
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel,
F(5, 545) = 2.44, p = .034. The infantry occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404
participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.06. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX,
18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.73. The
intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and slightly disagreed
with this statement (M= 2.49). The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23
participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.09. The communications occupational
field consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.30. All other
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.07.
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All occupational fields either slightly disagreed with this statement or a neutral response,
indicating disparity among occupational fields regarding where manpower should be
sourced if a C2 operator occupational field were created. Mean responses among
different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38.
Among different occupational fields, H02 was rejected regarding Organization,
Training, Materiel, and Personnel. Seven of 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct
reflected statistically significant differences among group means. The Marine Corps must
consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective employment of C2 systems.
Several occupational fields work within an infantry unit. The responsibility to train
occupational fields rests with Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting
Establishment. If no occupational field is expressly tasked with the ownership of C2
system employment, disparity among different occupational fields will continue to be
present, which ultimately degrades warfighter readiness. See Table 38, which identifies
group means for statistically significant findings related to H02.
Table 38
H02: Mean responses by OCCFLDfor questions resulting in statistical significance
OCCFLD

n

Q8

Q9

Qll

Q12

Q13

Q17

Q21

03XX (Infantry)

404

2.50

2.39

3.21

4.14

3.10

2.43

3.06

Other Combat Arms

22

2.82

2.45

3.00

4.64

2.95

2.18

2.73

02XX (Intelligence)

51

2.82

2.75

3.00

4.02

3.25

2.35

2.49

04XX (Logistics)

23

3.09

3.22

3.78

4.65

3.35

2.91

3.09

06XX (Communications)

23

3.17

2.30

2.70

4.30

2.30

2.04

3.30

Other

28

2.75

2.61

3.29

4.50

3.32

2.79

3.07

Note. Total Sample = 551. Q8, Q9 = Organization; Ql 1, Q12, Q13 = Training; Q17 = Materiel; Q21 =
Personnel.
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Hypothesiso3 focused on experience and stated the following: There is no
relationship between experience and the perception of the effective employment of
Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Using one-way ANOVA, six
questions identified statistical significance among different levels of experience.
The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different
experience levels was Question 10, related to training. This question stated the following:
C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training. The sample
strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.57), indicating the perceived importance of C2
system training within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA; however, indicate the
null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(4, 546) = 6.65, p < .001. This
means that experience has an effect on how Marines view the importance of C2 system
training during PTP. Participants having between zero and four years of experience
consisted of six people, which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.83).
Participants having greater than four years and up to eight years of experience consisted
of 112 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M- 4.23). Participants having
greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63
people, which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.56). Participants having greater
than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 people,
which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.67). Participants with greater than 20
years of experience consisted of 125 people, which strongly agreed with this statement
(M= 4.68). Although all levels of experience agreed with this statement, the different
experience level has an effect on the perception of importance of C2 system training

during pre-deployment training. Mean responses among different experience levels are
reflected in Table 39.
Also within the Training category, Question 11 stated the following: Current C2
system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an
operational context. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.19),
indicating a need to evaluate C2 system training. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate
the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(4, 546) = 4.75, p = .001. This
indicates a difference in perception of the effectiveness of current C2 system training
among different experience levels. Participants having between zero and four years of
experience consisted of six people, which slightly disagreed with this statement (M=
2.33). Participants having greater than four years and up to eight years of experience
consisted of 112 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.03. Participants having
greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63
people and had a neutral mean response of 2.81. Participants having greater than 12 years
of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 people and had a neutral
mean response of 3.29. Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of
125 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.36. Regardless of experience,
participants did not agree with this statement, further emphasizing the need for training
program evaluation related to C2 system training. Mean responses among different
experience levels are reflected in Table 39.
Question 12, also within the Training category, stated the following: C2 system
training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). The
sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19), indicating the perceived
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importance of C2 system training within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA
indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(4, 546) = 2.84,
p = .024. This indicates a difference among different experience levels regarding whether
or not C2 system training should be required when preparing to deploy. Participants
having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people, which slightly
agreed with this statement (M= 4.33). Participants having greater than four years and up
to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people, which slightly agreed with this
statement (M- 3.88). Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to
12 years of experience consisted of 63 people, which slightly agreed with this statement
(M= 4.27). Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of
experience consisted of 245 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.25).
Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 people, which
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.31). All experience levels agreed with this
statement, which suggests the importance of C2 system training during pre-deployment
training. Mean responses among different experience levels are reflected in Table 39.
Within the Personnel category, Question 22 stated the following: Currently, COC
personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. The
sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.96), indicating a need to
evaluate readiness of COC personnel within infantry units prior to deployment. Results of
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel,
F(4, 546) = 2.48, p = .043. This indicates there is a different perception on readiness of
C2 system users leading up to deployment depending on experience level. Participants
having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people, which slightly
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agreed with this statement (M= 3.67). Participants having greater than four years and up
to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a neutral mean response of
3.07. Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of
experience consisted of 63 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.19. Participants
having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of
245 people and had a neutral mean response of 2.85. Participants with greater than 20
years of experience consisted of 125 people and had a neutral mean response of 2.93.
While the group with the least amount of experience slightly agreed with this statement,
all others provided a neutral response. This suggests a need to further explore the
readiness of Marines and their ability to conduct C2 prior to deployment. Mean responses
among different experience levels are reflected in Table 39.
Also within the Personnel category, Question 23 stated the following: COC staff
members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to
conduct PTP with other unit members. The sample provided a neutral response to this
statement (M= 2.67), indicating a need to evaluate the timely assignment of personnel
within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be
rejected related to personnel, F(4, 546) = 2.69, p = .030. This means that there is disparity
across different experience levels regarding unit readiness as a result of manpower being
assigned in a timely manner. Participants having between zero and four years of
experience consisted of six people and had a neutral mean response of 3.00. Participants
having greater than four years and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people
and had a neutral mean response of 2.80. Participants having greater than eight years of
experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 people and had a neutral
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mean response of 2.90. Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to
20 years of experience consisted of 245 people and had a neutral mean response of 2.64.
Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 people, which
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.46). Those with the most experience
disagreed with this statement, while all others provided a neutral response. This suggests
a problem area that must be further explored to ensure warfighter and unit readiness prior
to deployment. Mean responses among different experience levels are reflected in Table
39.
Question 24, within the Facilities category, was the last question that reflected
statistical significance based on different levels of experience. This question stated the
following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately supports
effective C2. The sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.53), indicating
Marines within infantry units generally have a positive perception of COC equipment.
Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to
facilities, F(4, 546) = 2.64, p = .033. These results indicate variance among different
levels of experience affecting perceptions of current COC equipment. Participants having
between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people, which slightly agreed
with this statement (M= 4.17). Participants having greater than four years and up to eight
years of experience consisted of 112 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M
= 3.71). Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of
experience consisted of 63 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.59).
Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience
consisted of 245 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.48. Participants with
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greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 people and had a neutral mean
response of 3.39. This question, in particular, resulted in a reciprocal relationship
between mean response and experience. Either the most senior participants truly believe
that the COC equipment needs improvement or they do not fully understand its
capabilities. Mean responses among different experience levels are reflected in Table 39.
Among different levels of experience, H03 was rejected regarding Training,
Personnel, and Facilities. Six of 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct reflected
statistically significant differences among group means. The Marine Corps must consider
this effect as a potential barrier to the effective employment of C2 systems. Disparity
among different levels of experience may be due to a generation gap, which can impact
technological understanding. Additionally, senior leaders not required to use current C2
systems earlier in their career may question the need for the technology. It is not always
the user's desire to employ C2 systems; C2 system employment is often due to a reporting
requirement from Higher Headquarters (HHQ). Technological advance is unlikely to
slow down, but it is very likely that it will become more complex. This effect must be
considered when significant decisions are made shaping future Marine Corps C2
capabilities. See Table 39, which identifies group means for statistically significant
findings related to H03.
Hypothesiso4 focused on rank and stated the following: There is no relationship
between rank and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2
systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Using one-way ANOVA, eleven questions
identified statistical significance among different levels of experience.
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Table 39
H03: Mean responses by experience for questions resulting in statistical significance
Experience

n

Q10

Qll

Q12

Q22

Q23

Q24

6

4.83

2.33

4.33

3.67

3.00

4.17

>4 - 8 Years

112

4.23

3.03

3.88

3.07

2.80

3.71

>8 - 12 Years

63

4.56

2.81

4.27

3.19

2.90

3.59

>12 -20 Years

245

4.67

3.29

4.25

2.85

2.64

3.48

>20 Years

125

4.68

3.36

4.31

2.93

2.46

3.39

0 - 4 Years

Note. Total Sample = 551. Q10, Ql 1, Q12 = Training; Q22, Q23 = Personnel; Q24 = Facilities.

The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different
experience levels was Question 7, related to doctrine. This question stated the following:
Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 employment practices witnessed in current
operations. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.74),
indicating indifference regarding the need to determine if Marine Corps doctrine should
be updated based on current operations. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null
hypothesis should be rejected related to doctrine, F(3, 547) = 4.67,/? = .003. This
indicates variance among different ranks regarding doctrine accurately reflecting C2
employment practices demonstrated in current operations. Staff Non-Commissioned
Officers (SNCOs) consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.01.
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.63.
Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.62.
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a neutral group
mean of 2.74. All ranks provided a neutral response to this statement. The Marine Corps
must determine if current operational concepts should be adopted into doctrine, or

112
dismiss current operations as being isolated to the current mission and unlikely to be
repeated in the future. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
Within the Organization category, Question 8 reflected statistical significance
among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables of
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample provided a
neutral response to this statement (M= 2.61), indicating indifference regarding the
current T/E within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null
hypothesis should be rejected related to organization, F(3, 547) = 4.49, p = .004. This
indicates variance among different ranks regarding the ability of equipment to support
effective employment of C2 systems. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral
group mean of 2.79. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral
group mean of 2.66. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.38). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted
of 27 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.89. Field Grade Officers slightly
disagreed with this statement, while all others provided a neutral response. Regardless, no
single rank-group agreed with this statement presenting a need to evaluate current T/E
related to C2 capabilities. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table
40.
Also within the Organization category, Question 9 reflected statistical
significance among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables
of organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.47), indicating a need to evaluate T/O
structure within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis
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should be rejected related to organization, F(3, 547) = 7.08,/? < .001. This indicates
variance among different ranks regarding the organizational structure of units supporting
the effective employment of C2. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group
mean of 2.72. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group
mean of 2.52. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly disagreed
with this statement (M= 2.19). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27
people and had a neutral group mean of 2.70. With the exception of Field Grade Officers,
who slightly disagreed with this statement, all others provided a neutral response. This
suggests a further need to examine organizational structure to effectively employ C2
systems. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
Within the Training category, four of six questions reflected statistical
significance among the different ranks. Question 10 was the first item. This question
stated the following: C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment
training. The sample strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.57), indicating a need to
evaluate the importance of C2 system training within infantry units. Results of one-way
ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(3, 547) =
6.11, p < .001. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the importance of
C2 system training during pre-deployment training. SNCOs consisted of 149 people,
which strongly agreed with this statement (M- 4.57). Company Grade Officers consisted
of 186 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.39). Field Grade Officers
consisted of 189 people, which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.74).
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people, which strongly agreed with
this statement (M~ 4.63). All ranks agreed with this statement, which suggests a need to
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develop a plan to ensure units are adequately prepared to conduct C2 prior to
deployment. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
Question 11 was the next item within the Training category reflecting statistical
significance. This question stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately
supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. The sample
provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.19), indicating a need to evaluate C2
system training. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be
rejected related to training, F(3, 547) = 5.60, p = .001. This indicates variance among
different ranks regarding the effectiveness of current C2 system training. SNCOs
consisted of 149 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.50). Company
Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.03. Field
Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.12.
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a neutral group
mean of 3.11. With the exception of SNCOs, who slightly agreed with this statement, all
other ranks provided a neutral response to this statement, suggesting a need to implement
training program evaluation related to C2 system training. Using C2 systems in a
classroom is not the same as using them during combat operations. Mean responses
among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
Question 12 was the next item within the Training category reflecting statistical
significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated
within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). The sample slightly agreed with this
statement (M= 4.19), indicating a need to evaluate the emphasis placed on C2 system
training within PTP. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be
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rejected related to training, F(3, 547) = 4.96,p - .002. This indicates variance among
different ranks regarding mandated C2 system training during pre-deployment training.
SNCOs consisted of 149 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (A/= 4.43).
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people, which slightly agreed with this
statement (M= 4.00). Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly agreed
with this statement (M= 4.15). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27
people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.48). All ranks agreed with this
statement, indicating the perceived degree of importance of C2 system training during
pre-deployment. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
Question 15 was the last item within the Training category reflecting statistical
significance. This question stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2
Training Continuum. The sample slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.31),
indicating a need to evaluate what training is provided at multiple venues. Results of oneway ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(3, 547)
= 3.02, p = .029. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the C2 Training
Continuum, which establishes a progression through multiple training venues. SNCOs
consisted of 149 people, which slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.48).
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people, which slightly disagreed with this
statement (M= 2.17). Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.30). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted
of 27 people, which slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.41). The C2 Training
Continuum outlines what training is provided by what venue. If Marines are not familiar

with this construct, it is unlikely they will attend recommended training during predeployment training. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
Within the Personnel category, there were three questions indicating statistical
significance. Question 20 was the first item within the personnel category reflecting
statistical significance. This question stated the following: A primary MOS should be
established to provide dedicated C2 system operators. The sample provided a neutral
response to this statement (M= 3.28), indicating Marines are undecided regarding the
need for a C2 system operator MOS. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null
hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, F(3, 547) = 3.02, p = .029. This
indicates variance among different ranks regarding whether or not a C2 operator MOS
should be established. SNCOs consisted of 149 people, which slightly agreed with this
statement (M= 3.54). Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral
group mean of 3.01. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral
group mean of 3.30. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and
had a neutral group mean of 3.44. With the exception of SNCOs, who slightly agreed
with this statement, all other ranks provided a neutral response, indicating a need to
further explore the need to establish a C2 operator occupational field. Mean responses
among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
The next item reflecting statistical significance in the Personnel category was
Question 21. This question stated the following: C2 system operator structure should be
sourced from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). The sample provided a
neutral response to this statement (M= 3.01), indicating Marines are undecided regarding
the source of manpower if a C2 operator MOS were established. Results of one-way
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ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, F(3, 547) =
4.52, p = .004. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding what occupational
field should provide the manpower to establish a C2 system operator MOS. SNCOs
consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.22. Company Grade Officers
consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.05. Field Grade Officers
consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.76. Government Civilians
(GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.26. Neutral
responses across the ranks indicate indifference regarding the source of manpower if a C2
operator occupational field were to be established. If the Marine Corps determines an
occupational field is required, manpower will likely present challenges. Mean responses
among different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
The last item reflecting statistical significance in the Personnel category was
Question 23. This question stated the following: COC staff members across the
warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other
unit members. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M- 2.67),
indicating indifference regarding the timely assignment of COC personnel. Results of
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel,
F(3, 547) = 4.12, p = .007. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the
assignment of the right personnel at the right time to conduct pre-deployment training
with an assigned unit. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean of
2.67. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of
2.84. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.55.
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people, which slightly disagreed
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with this statement (M= 2.22). None of the ranks agreed with this statement, which
suggests a need to find resolution to this perceived problem. Mean responses among
different ranks are reflected in Table 40.
One item in the Facilities category reflected statistical significance. Question 24
stated the following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately
supports effective C2. The sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.53),
indicating Marines are generally positive regarding COC equipment. Results of one-way
ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to facilities, F(3, 547) =
4.15, p = .006. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the effectiveness
of current COC facilities. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean
of 3.44. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people, which slightly agreed with this
statement (M= 3.70). Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral
group mean of 3.40. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people, which
slightly agreed with this statement {M= 3.70). Two groups slightly agreed, while the
other two groups provided a neutral response. Ideally, all ranks would agree with this
statement. This indicates either a lack of understanding of COC capabilities or a potential
opportunity for improvement. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in
Table 40.
Among different ranks, H04 was rejected regarding Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Personnel, and Facilities. Eleven of 20 questions across the DOTMLPF
construct reflected statistically significant differences among group means. The Marine
Corps must consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective employment of C2
systems. Disparity among different ranks may be due to similar reasons expressed within
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different levels of experience. C2 system operators tend to be relatively junior Marines,
while those that interpret the meaning of the information provided by C2 systems are
typically Staff Non-commissioned Officers and above. Disparity among ranks may be
explained by the different billets associated with C2 system employment. Decisionmakers must think through the eyes of the C2 system user. Understanding this effect
during decision-making can impact future C2 capabilities. See Table 40, which identifies
group means for statistically significant findings related to H04.
Table 40
H04: Mean responses by rank for questions resulting in statistical significance
Staff Non-Commissioned
Officers

Company Grade
Officers

Field Grade
Officers

Government Civilians
(GS12-GS15)

n

149

186

189

27

Q7

3.01

2.63

2.62

2.74

Q8

2.79

2.66

2.38

2.89

Q9

2.72

2.52

2.19

2.70

Q10

4.57

4.39

4.74

4.63

Qll

3.50

3.03

3.12

3.11

Q12

4.43

4.00

4.15

4.48

Q15

2.48

2.17

2.30

2.41

Q20

3.54

3.01

3.30

3.44

Q21

3.22

3.05

2.76

3.26

Q23

2.67

2.84

2.55

2.22

Q24

3.44

3.70

3.40

3.70

Note. Total Sample = 551. Q7 = Doctrine; Q8, Q9 = Doctrine; Q10, Ql 1, Q12, Q15 = Training; Q20, Q21,
Q23 = Personnel; Q24 = Facilities.

Hypothesises focused on recent deployment experience and stated the following:
There is no relationship between recent deployment experience and the perception of the

effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct.
Using a /-test, just one question reflected statistical significant differences among groups.
Question 19, within the Leadership and Education category, stated the following:
Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational
context. The mean response of those that have recently deployed (M= 3.03) was greater
than those that had not (M= 2.80), t(549) = 2.07, (p =.039). Related to leadership and
education, the null hypothesis would be rejected. This indicates variance among those
that have recently deployed and those that have not recently deployed regarding unit
leaders' awareness of C2 system capabilities. Both groups provided a neutral response to
this statement, suggesting an opportunity for improvement, which could most likely be
realized through a training course targeted toward unit leaders.
Among the two groups (recently deployed and not recently deployed), H05 was
rejected regarding Leadership and Education. Although only one of 20 questions across
the DOTMLPF construct reflected statistically significant differences among group
means, the Marine Corps must consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective
employment of C2 systems. Any disparity among those that have recently deployed and
those that had not recently deployed must be overcome. Headquarters, Marine Corps and
the Supporting Establishment must continually adapt to support current warfighter needs
within fiscal constraints. Marine Corps leadership must determine what feedback from
forward-deployed units requires corrective action and adapt its training and education
programs accordingly. Understanding this effect can positively impact warfighter
readiness for the next unit sent into harm's way. See Table 41, which identifies group
means for statistically significant findings related to H05.
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Table 41
H05: Mean responses by recent deployment experience for questions resulting in statistical
significance
n

Q19

Deployed

435

3.03

Not Deployed

116

2.80

Note. Total Sample = 551. Q19 = Leadership and Education.

Recommendations
As a result of this study, there are several recommendations for improvement
across the DOTMLPF construct. The descriptive data compiled within this study suggests
potential opportunities for improvement. Statistically significant variance identified
among different demographics on several issues indicate different perceptions of the
effective employment of C2 systems across the five research hypotheses.
Recommendations for improvement will be provided based on each research hypothesis,
which will be followed by recommendations for further research.
Hypothesisoi addressed different perspectives among the C2 system users within
the Operating Forces and those that implement and train C2 systems from Headquarters,
Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. The null hypothesis was rejected related
to Training (Question 13) and Leadership and Education (Question 19).
1.

Question 13 stated the following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized

throughout PTP, including individual and collective training and mission rehearsal
exercises. Although the /-test resulted in a statistically significant difference, both groups
had a neutral mean response, which indicates an opportunity for improvement. The first
recommendation for improvement, related to Training, is for the Marine Corps to
determine if C2 system training is, in fact, adequately emphasized during pre-deployment

training. To make this determination, the Manne Corps must implement training program
evaluation across the C2 Training Continuum to ensure current training meets its
intended objectives. While doing so, it is of vital importance to include representatives
from the Operating Forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment
when shaping the evaluation. By including representation from both groups, the Marine
Corps will improve its training programs and gain insight into its true impact on combat
operations.
2.

Question 19 stated the following: Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to

best employ C2 systems in an operational environment. Although the /-test resulted in a
statistically significant difference, both groups had a neutral mean response, which
indicates an opportunity for improvement. The second recommendation for improvement,
related to Leadership and Education, is for Marine Corps leadership to consider
developing a training course for unit leaders focused on C2 system capabilities. By
developing a course suitable for unit leaders the Marine Corps may be able to bettercapitalize on the capabilities provided by current C2 systems.
Hypothesiso2 addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2
systems among different occupational fields. The null hypothesis was rejected related to
Organization (Questions 8, 9), Training (Questions 11, 12, 13), Materiel (Question 17),
and Personnel (Question 21). Question 13 (Training) was previously addressed. The
remaining questions reflecting statistical significance within H02 are addressed below.
3.

Question 8 stated the following: Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the

effective employment of C2 systems. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample
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provided a neutral response (M= 2.61), indicating an opportunity for improvement. The
third recommendation for improvement, related to Organization, is for Marine Corps
leadership to evaluate current unit Tables of Equipment (T/E) to determine if the
Operating Forces are properly equipped to exercise C2.
4.

Question 9 stated the following: Current tables of organization (T/O) support the

effective employment of C2 systems. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.47), indicating an opportunity for
improvement. The fourth recommendation for improvement, related to Organization, is
for Marine Corps leadership to evaluate current unit Tables of Organization (T/O) to
determine if the Operating Forces are structured appropriately across the various
occupational fields within infantry units.
5.

Question 11 stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately supports

the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational environment. Results of oneway ANOVA identified a statistically significant difference among different occupational
fields. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.19), indicating an
opportunity for improvement. The fifth recommendation for improvement, related to
Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to evaluate C2 system training provided at all
appropriate training venues, which is related to the previous recommendation for training
program evaluation.
6.

Question 12 stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated within

the pre-deployment training program (PTP). Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample

slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19). The sixth recommendation for
improvement, related to Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to ensure that all
relevant personnel, regardless of occupational field, are receiving appropriate training.
7.

Question 17 stated the following: There is a widespread understanding of the

capabilities of C2 systems across the warfighting functions. Results of one-way ANOVA
identified a statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The
sample slightly disagreed with this statement (M- 2.44). The seventh recommendation
for improvement, related to Materiel, is for Marine Corps leadership to determine the
meaning of this variance among different occupational fields and determine why the
Marines disagreed with this statement.
8.

Question 21 stated the following: C2 operator structure should be sourced from

within the infantry occupational field. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample
provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.01). The eighth recommendation for
improvement, related to Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to determine if a C2
system operator should be established, and, if so, who will provide manpower to support
this requirement.
Hypothesiso3 addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2
systems among different levels of experience. The null hypothesis was rejected related to
Training (Questions 10, 11, 12), Personnel (Question 22, 23), and Facilities (Question
24). Question 11 (Training) was previously addressed. The remaining questions reflecting
statistical significance within H03 are addressed below.

9.

Question 10 stated the following: C2 system training is an important component

of pre-deployment training. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a statistically
significant difference among different levels of experience. The sample strongly agreed
with this statement ( M - 4.57). The ninth recommendation for improvement, related to
Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to continue to pursue a comprehensive C2
Training Continuum throughout individual and collective training venues.
10.

Question 12 stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated within

the pre-deployment training program (PTP). Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different levels of experience. The sample
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19). The tenth recommendation for
improvement, related to Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to ensure C2 system
operators attend appropriate training courses, which is related to the previous
recommendation for a comprehensive C2 Training Continuum.
11.

Question 22 stated the following: Currently, COC personnel are adequately

trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. Results of one-way ANOVA
identified a statistically significant difference among different levels of experience. The
sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.96). The eleventh
recommendation for improvement, related to Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to
ensure C2 system operators are properly trained prior to deployment, which is related to
the previous recommendation for a comprehensive C2 Training Continuum.
12.

Question 23 stated the following: COC staff members across the warfighting

functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other unit
members. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a statistically significant difference

among different levels of experience. The sample provided a neutral response to this
statement (M- 2.67). The twelfth recommendation for improvement, related to
Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to evaluate its manpower assignment system to
ensure units are properly sourced with appropriate personnel in a timely manner.
13.

Question 24 stated the following: Current combat operations center (COC)

equipment adequately supports effective C2. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different levels of experience. The sample
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.53). The thirteenth recommendation for
improvement, related to Facilities, is for Marine Corps leadership to continue to ensure
COC equipment meets warfighter needs and attempt to understand why variance among
different levels of experience exists related to this topic.
Hypothesises addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2
systems among different ranks. The null hypothesis was rejected related to Doctrine
(Question 7), Organization (Questions 8, 9), Training (Questions 10, 11, 12, 15),
Personnel (Question 20, 21, 23), and Facilities (Question 24). Questions 8 and 9
(Organization), Questions 10,11, and 12 (Training), Questions 21 and 23 (Personnel),
and Question 24 (Facilities) were previously addressed. The remaining questions
reflecting statistical significance within H04 are addressed below.
14.

Question 7 stated the following: Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2

employment practices witnessed in current operations. Results of one-way ANOVA
identified a statistically significant difference among different ranks. The sample
provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.74). The fourteenth recommendation
for improvement, related to Doctrine, is for Marine Corps leadership to determine if

127
doctrine is in need of updating. Current operations may or may not be the way that the
Marine Corps operates in the future; however, this needs to be determined to ensure that
the associated doctrinal publications maintain currency and relevance.
15.

Question 15 stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 Training

Continuum. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a statistically significant difference
among different ranks. The sample slightly disagreed this statement (M= 2.31). The
fifteenth recommendation for improvement, related to Training, is for Marine Corps
leadership to continue to develop a comprehensive C2 Training Continuum and ensure
unit commanders understand what training is available. This is related to several previous
recommendations.
16.

Question 20 stated the following: A primary MOS should be established to

provide dedicated C2 system operators. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a
statistically significant difference among different ranks. The sample provided a neutral
response to this statement (M= 3.28). The sixteenth recommendation for improvement,
related to Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to continue to evaluate the need for a
dedicated C2 system operator occupational field, which is related to a previous
recommendation. If this is validated as a requirement, sourcing manpower will likely be
problematic. Regardless, it is a worthwhile effort to develop alternative courses of action
and present them to senior decision-makers.
Hypothesises addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2
systems among those that have recently deployed and those that have not. The null
hypothesis was rejected related to Leadership and Education (Question 19). Results of the
Mest indicated that those that had recently deployed responded with a higher group mean
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(M= 3.03) than those who had not recently deployed (M= 2.80); however, both result in
a neutral response. Question 19 was previously addressed within Hoi .
Recommendations for Further Research
As indicated by the literature, IT changes at a rapid rate. Implementing the same
acquisition process regardless of functional area introduces challenges due to different
rates of technological advance. If technology outpaces the procurement process used to
implement a new technology, the solution may be dated prior to initial fielding to the user
(Gibbs, 2009). By developing an Information System Strategy, the Marine Corps could
better-define its desired capabilities (Pollais, 2003), which would provide a proactive
posture against potential threats in future conflicts. Additionally, this may provide insight
into improved business practices associated with the procurement of new IT solutions and
how this may lead to more holistic acquisition practices (Powner, 2004). Although
current C2 systems were fielded at different times and under different warfighting
functions, they are used in real-world operations as the collective C2 system of systems.
For that reason, they must be managed this way from a capability perspective. As stated
by Powner (2004), building this portfolio requires a detailed information system strategy
that will span the test of time. Of course this will change with technological development
and enemy threats, but it will serve as a starting point to ensure objectives are met. The
Marine Corps could benefit from further research evaluating the establishment of an
Information System Strategy.
Further research is recommended to address the meaning of the variance found in
this study. Variance among different occupational fields, levels of experience, and
different ranks bring to question the training and education associated with C2. Because
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this subject is resource intensive, the Marine Corps should continue to refine how it
conducts C2, the tools used to exercise C2, and the training associated with enabling
successful C2. Leadership will want to know the return-on-investment (ROI) of these
investments in terms of resources beyond dollars (Serafeimidis & Smithson, 2000).
Facing times of fiscal limitations, addressing the meaning of the variance found among
different demographics is critical to ensuring successful C2 in future conflicts.
Across different demographics, variance was consistently reflected regarding the
establishment of a C2 operator occupational field. There appears to be some confusion on
who, exactly, is expected to do what regarding C2 system employment. Marine Corps
training is centered on two things, which include occupational fields, and to a lesser
degree, unit type. Roles must be clearly defined when implementing IT to ensure training
requirements are properly addressed (Pineda, 2010). Without clear ownership of C2
system administration and employment, the Marine Corps will likely continue to
experience similar feedback within unit after-action reports. If no occupational field
expressly owns C2, training gaps are likely to continue. Praslova (2010) suggests training
must be evaluated to provide results. Variance across different demographics suggests
disparity related to this topic. Evaluation of current training could provide insight to
shape future decisions on this matter. Further research is recommended to explore the
option of establishing an occupational field to focus on C2 system employment.
Lastly, further research is recommended to conduct a similar study throughout the
Marine Corps. Every occupational field and warfighting function throughout the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducts C2; therefore, if this study were conducted
across the MAGTF, the Marine Corps may gain greater insight into this functional area.

Conducting this study across the MAGTF could potentially enhance the performance of
C2 system employment throughout the Marine Corps. This study focused on the infantry
community. Conducting this study throughout the Marine Corps will provide a
comprehensive study that could serve as a significant benefit to resource planning as the
Marine Corps faces a very difficult fiscal climate.
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APPENDIX A
Survey Instrument (Original)
Purpose:
The purpose of this survey is to collect data to identify potential barriers to the effective
employment of Marine Corps command and control systems to enhance warfighter
readiness.
Instructions:
There are 25 questions on this survey. The first five questions address demographic
information. Please answer based on your current billet assignment.
1. What is your current rank?
a. SSgt - MGySgt/SgtMaj (E-6 - E-9)
b. W 0 1 - C a p t ( W O - l - 0 - 3 )
c. Maj - Col (0-4 - 0-6)
d. GS-09-GS-12
e. GS-13-GS-15
2. How long have you served as a Marine and/or Civilian Marine?
a. 0 - 4 Years
b. 5 - 8 Years
c. 9 - 1 2 Years
d. 1 3 - 2 0 Years
e. Over 20 Years
3. What is (what was) your primary Occupational Field (OCCFLD) while in
uniform?
a. Fill in the blank
4. Have you been forward-deployed in support of real-world operations within the
last 36 months?
a. Yes
b. No
5. Which organization best describes your current billet assignment?
a. Operating Forces (Active Duty)
b. MARFORRES
c. HQMC
d. Supporting Establishment
e. Resident PME Student
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Instructions:
The remaining questions of the survey have been developed along the DOTMLPF
construct, consisting of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities. All statements will have five different options. If
you strongly disagree with the statement, select 1. If you slightly disagree, select 2. If you
are neutral, or indifferent, select 3. If you slightly agree, select 4. If you strongly agree
with the statement, select 5. Please provide the best answer based on your knowledge of
Marine Corps C2 systems.
DOCTRINE
6. Current Marine Corps doctrine adequately supports the effective employment of
USMC C2 systems.
7. Doctrinal publications support the execution of C2 during current operations.
ORGANIZATION
8. Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2
systems.
9. Current tables of organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2
systems.
TRAINING
10. C2 system training is important relative to other pre-deployment training.
11. Current C2 system training supports the effective employment of C2 systems in
an operational environment.
12. C2 system training should be mandated in the pre-deployment training program
(PTP).
13. C2 system training is emphasized throughout PTP, including individual and
collective training and mission rehearsal exercises.
14. Marines are generally knowledgeable of what C2 system training is available in
CONUS.
15. Marines know where to go to receive training on C2 systems.
MATERIEL
16. Current C2 systems adequately support current operations.
17. There is a widespread understanding of the capabilities of C2 systems across the
warfighting functions.

LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION
18. C2 system training should be incorporated into professional military education
(PME) programs.
19. Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an
operational environment.
PERSONNEL
20. A primary MOS should be established to provide dedicated C2 system operators.
21. The Marine Corps should give up infantry Marines to fulfill personnel
requirements to generate a C2 system operator MOS.
22. Currently, COC personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet
prior to deployment.
23. COC staff members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with
enough time to conduct PTP with other unit members.
FACILITIES
24. The current combat operations center (COC) equipment adequately supports the
effective employment of C2 systems.
25. Units are generally proficient in the installation and operation of the COC prior to
deployment.
Thank you for participating in this survey.

APPENDIX B
Survey Instrument (Revised)
Purpose:
The purpose of this survey is to collect data to identify potential barriers to the effective
employment of Marine Corps command and control systems to enhance warfighter
readiness.
Instructions:
There are 25 questions on this survey. The first five questions address demographic
information. Please answer based on your current billet assignment.
1. What is your current rank?
a. SSgt - MGySgt/SgtMaj (E-6 - E-9)
b. WOl - Capt (WO-1 - 0-3)
c. Maj - Col (0-4 - 0-6)
d. GS09-GS12
e. GS13-GS15
2. How long have you served as a Marine and/or Civilian Marine?
a. 0 - 4 Years
b. > 4 - 8 Years
c. > 8 - 1 2 Years
d. > 1 2 - 2 0 Years
e. >20 Years
3. What is (what was) your primary Occupational Field (OCCFLD) while in
uniform?
a. Fill in the blank
4. Have you been forward-deployed in support of real-world operations within the
last 36 months?
a. Yes
b. No
5. Which organization best describes your current billet assignment?
a. Operating Forces (Active Duty)
b. MARFORRES
c. HQMC
d. Supporting Establishment
e. Resident PME Student

Instructions:
The remaining questions of the survey have been developed along the DOTMLPF
construct, consisting of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities. All statements will have five different options. If
you strongly disagree with the statement, select 1. If you slightly disagree, select 2. If you
are neutral, or indifferent, select 3. If you slightly agree, select 4. If you strongly agree
with the statement, select 5. Please provide the best answer based on your knowledge of
Marine Corps C2 systems.
DOCTRINE
6. Current Marine Corps doctrine provides sufficient guidance to effectively employ
C2 systems.
7. Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 employment practices witnessed in
current operations.
ORGANIZATION
8. Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2
systems.
9. Current tables of organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2
systems.
TRAINING
10. C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training.
11. Current C2 system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2
systems in an operational environment.
12. C2 system training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training
program (PTP).
13. C2 system training is adequately emphasized throughout PTP, including
individual and collective training and mission rehearsal exercises.
14. Marines are generally knowledgeable of what C2 system training is available at
home-station.
15. Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 Training Continuum.
MATERIEL
16. Current C2 systems adequately support current operations.
17. There is a widespread understanding of the capabilities of C2 systems across the
warfighting functions.
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LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION
18. C2 system training should be incorporated into professional military education
(PME) programs.
19. Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an
operational environment.
PERSONNEL
20. A primary MOS should be established to provide dedicated C2 system operators.
21. C2 operator structure should be sourced from within the infantry occupational
field.
22. Currently, COC personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet
prior to deployment.
23. COC staff members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with
enough time to conduct PTP with other unit members.
FACILITIES
24. Current combat operations center (COC) equipment adequately supports effective
C2.
25. Units are adequately trained to proficiently install, operate, and maintain the COC
prior to deployment.

Thank you for participating in this survey.

APPENDIX C
Email Instructions for Expert Panel
Gentlemen:
As you know, I am pursuing a PhD in Education through Old Dominion University. My dissertation topic
is focused on Marine Corps C2, and all of the issues that shape the C2 training environment. I plan to
conduct survey research to collect the data for my study. To do this, I have developed a survey based on
topics presented in the literature, which were then tied to current Marine Corps issues across the
DOTMLPF construct. See below for background, scope, and context.
The purpose of this study is to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of Marine Corps
command and control systems to enhance warfighter readiness. The scope of this study is limited to C2
systems used by the infantry community. Recent unit After-Action Reports (AARs) and Systemic Trends
Reports (STRs) provided by MAGTF-TC lead me to believe that we can improve upon current business
practices across the DOTMLPF construct to better-prepare our Marines prior to deployment, even in times
of fiscal constraint. Many people are working on several initiatives to improve the current state of C2. The
results of this study will better-inform these efforts.
Population
1.
2.
3.
4.

Active and Reserve SNCOs and Officers up to and including Colonels within the infantry MOS
SNCOs and Officers of any MOS that are now serving in an infantry unit or have recently served
in an infantry unit
SNCOs and Officers within the Division/MEB/MEF staff familiar with C2 systems used in the
infantry community
SNCOs, Officers, and Civilian Marines (GS12 - GS15) involved in the capability development,
acquisition, and training of C2 systems from HQMC and the Supporting Establishment

Please review my survey (attached) and make corrections or changes where appropriate to improve the
clarity of content. This will help me achieve content and construct validity in my study.
Thank you,
Aaron
Capt Aaron B. Lang, USMCR
Doctoral Candidate
Old Dominion University

APPENDIX D
Survey Participation Email to Organizational Leadership
Marines and Civilian Leaders:
I am a Reserve Marine nearing completion of a doctoral degree program through Old Dominion University.
In my civilian employment, I have worked at Marine Corps Base Quantico focused on C2 system training
for nearly five years. As I have become intimately familiar with current Marine Corps policies and
processes to procure, implement, and train our warfighters to effectively use C2 systems in a deployed
environment, I would like to gather your feedback as part of my doctoral dissertation.
The purpose of this study is to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of Marine Corps
command and control systems to enhance warfighter readiness. The scope of this study is limited to C2
systems used by the infantry community. Recent unit After-Action Reports (AARs) and Systemic Trends
Reports (STRs) provided by MAGTF-TC lead me to believe that we can improve upon current business
practices across the DOTMLPF construct to better-prepare our Marines prior to deployment, even in times
of fiscal constraint. Many people are working on several initiatives to improve the current state of C2. The
results of this study will better-inform these efforts.
I would like to ask you to participate in a very brief web survey to provide your thoughts on this issue. The
target audience of this study includes the following:
1. Active and Reserve SNCOs and Officers up to and including Colonels within the infantry MOS
2. SNCOs and Officers of any MOS that are now serving in an infantry unit or have recently served
in an infantry unit
3. SNCOs and Officers within the Division/MEB/MEF staff familiar with C2 systems used in the
infantry community
4. SNCOs, Officers, and Civilian Marines (GS12 - GS15) involved in the capability development,
acquisition, and training of C2 systems from HQMC and the Supporting Establishment
In compliance with Human Subjects Protection protocol, this survey is voluntary and completely
anonymous. Names and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII) will not be collected in this study.
All data will be reported in aggregate to ensure that no person can be uniquely identified following survey
completion.
Please forward this web link to members of your organization that meet the criteria stated above. At the
conclusion of the study, I will provide a presentation to share the results of the study with organizational
leadership. I anticipate this being completed in April 2012.
So you can complete the survey and participate in the study, please click on the link below to complete the
survey regarding the effective employment of USMC C2 systems.
<URL>
Respectfully,
Capt Aaron B. Lang, USMCR
Doctoral Candidate
Old Dominion University

APPENDIX E
Cover Letter to Survey Participants
Marines:
You are invited to participate in a brief survey addressing your perspective of the effective employment of
Command and Control (C2) systems used in the Combat Operations Center (COC) of the infantry
community. Your feedback is a critical component of this study and I assure you that the survey will take
you no more than five minutes to complete.
The purpose of this study is to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of Marine Corps
command and control systems to enhance warfighter readiness. The scope of this study is limited to C2
systems used by the infantry community. Recent unit After-Action Reports (AARs) and Systemic Trends
Reports (STRs) provided by MAGTF-TC lead me to believe that we can improve upon current business
practices across the DOTMLPF construct to better-prepare our Marines prior to deployment, even in times
of fiscal constraint. Many people are working on several initiatives to improve the current state of C2. The
results of this study will better-inform these efforts.
In compliance with Human Subjects Protection protocol, this survey is voluntary and completely
anonymous. Names and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII) will not be collected in this study.
All data will be reported in aggregate to ensure that no person can be uniquely identified following survey
completion.
At the conclusion of the study, I will provide a presentation to share the results of the study with your
organizational leadership. I anticipate this being completed in April 2012.
Your time is greatly appreciated.
Please click on the link below to complete the survey regarding the effective employment of USMC C2
systems.
<URL>
Respectfully,
Capt Aaron B. Lang, USMCR
Doctoral Candidate
Old Dominion University

APPENDIX F
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Aaron B. Lang
Darden College of Education
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia 23529
Aaron Lang is a Reserve Marine Corps officer with 15 years of military experience. With
a firm understanding of Marine Corps Command and Control and DoD acquisition
practices, he has been working as a defense contractor at Marine Corps Base Quantico,
VA, for the past seven years. He possesses skills in project management, exercise design
and support, technical writing, training program evaluation, and curriculum development.
His research interests include applying academic rigor to the DoD training environment,
the development and evaluation of military training programs, and the development of
enterprise Information System strategies within global organizations.
Education
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